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I. INTRODUCTION: LAWS OF IISREPRESENTATION AND THE
UNIQUE STATUS OF RADIO
In explaining the limits of protection under the First Amendment,
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote: "The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."' This famous dictum has
often been cited to underscore the fact that free speech will not be a viable
defense when such speech is used to perpetrate a fraud or misrepresentation
that is relied upon by others. When Holmes first scripted his observation in
1919, radio and the electronic mass media were still in their infancy. The
next year would see the start of the Very first broadcast radio station in the
United States.2 Few had heard of commercial radio broadcasts up to that
point. The creation of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
3was still fourteen years away.
With the advent of commercial broadcasting, the challenges of
balancing free speech with the interests of protecting the public from
potentially harmful frauds raised to new levels. The theater in which one
can shout "fire" is no longer confined to a single locale. The venue now
ranges in size from individuals, to communities, to the entire global village.
Since its inception, the FCC struggled in deciding where to draw the
line regarding broadcast hoaxes. On the one hand, the FCC has sought to
enforce regulations which ensure that the airwaves are used, among other
reasons, "for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property." 4 On the
other hand, the FCC has been reluctant to dictate the content of
broadcasters, lest it stifle the vibrancy of the media in reaching its potential
to fulfill artistic, informational, and cultural needs.
When it comes to perpetrating hoaxes, no medium other than the
Internet has been as prolific as the radio. Not only is radio pervasive, it can
1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919).
2. The honors went to KDKA in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. See A Science Odyssey:
People and Discoveries: KDKA Begins to Broadcast (visited Sept. 22, 1999)
<http:/www.pbs.orglwgbhlaso/databanklentries/dt2Ora.html>.
3. See MuRRAY EDELMAN, THE LICENSING OF RADIo SERvICEs IN THE UNrrED STATES,
1927 To 1947: A STUDY IN ADMINSTRATIVE FORMULATION OFPOUCY 6-7 (1950).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
5. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1994).
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have profound effects on its listeners. Author Tim Crook explained the
primary reason why radio can have such a unique effect:
[R]adio was the first electronic medium of mass entertainment and
radio is a more psychological medium. Its relationship with its
audience is based on an emotional and imaginative bond. In 1997[,].
radio has not lost its importance as a huge and significant source for
news and entertainment[,] and the opportunity to hoodwink the
audience is as strong as it has ever been.
Certainly, the opportunity to mislead an audience exists in other
mediums. Television and print media are equally capable of misleading
consumers if the producers of their content are determined to do so.
Additionally, the relatively unregulated Internet is fertile ground for
various types of fraud and misinformation. However, certain limitations on
other media technologies prevent them from having the same impact as
radio. Print is not as immediate as radio. For instance, it is hard to imagine
a newspaper displaying the headline, "Community Church Is Burning Now
as Reader Is Reading this Paper." Whether the text is from newspapers or
the Internet, it can only convey events that have taken place in the past or
make predictions about the future. Television can have a more immediate
impact, but viewing television requires an information consumer to be in a
passive state. Few productive actions can be achieved simultaneously while
watching television.
One of the reasons radio remains an effective hoax medium is its
unique ability to engage audiences while they are involved in different
tasks. For instance, people can receive radio information while they are
driving to work, washing dishes, typing, jogging, showering, or performing
any number of tasks. In terms of portability, radio remains second only to
newspapers in its ability to follow the audience throughout their daily lives.
Visual media-such as print, television, and the Internet-require the
undivided attention of a static viewer in order to receive information. This
unique difference gives radio the opportunity to maximize the impact of a
hoax by allowing gullible listeners to immediately act on the information
they receive.
Because radio remains the only medium that combines the elements
of immediacy, portability, psychological impacts on the imagination, and
the ability to reach listeners throughout their daily routines, it remains the
most conducive for perpetrating hoaxes on unsuspecting audiences. While
hoaxes, frauds, and misrepresentations have occurred on all types of mass
6. Tim Crook, The Psychological Power of Radio (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.irdp.co.ukhoax.htm>.
7. Adventurous drivers have been observed trying to read newspapers and drive at the
same time. The corresponding decline in their driving habits speaks for itself.
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media, cases demonstrate that radio remains one of the most effective
means for their execution.
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN BROADCAST HoAx LAW
The earliest regulations of radio indicate that authorities were
certainly aware of some of the possible dangers that the medium posed as
far as hoaxes were concerned. The Radio Act of 19128 provided in section
7, "[tjhat a person, company, or corporation within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall not knowingly utter or transmit, or cause to be uttered
or transmitted, any false or fraudulent distress signal or call or false or
fraudulent signal,- call, or other radiogram of any kind."9 The updated
Radio Act of 1927 (1927 Act)'0 carried over the provision outlawing any
false distress signal using the radio waves." Such problems apparently
merited an even higher concern than the general interference between
broadcasting signals, which in turn was not truly rectified until the early
1930s.
12
Congress again overhauled radio regulation with the Communications
13Act of 1934 (1934 Act). That year, Congress repealed the false distress
section of the 1927 Act and transferred its contents to section 325(a) of the
1934 Act, which is still in force today. 14 The provision states: "No person
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall knowingly utter or
transmit, or cause to be uttered or transmitted, any false or fraudulent
signal of distress, or communication relating thereto .... .""
The scope of the 1934 provisions is considerably narrower than the
1912 regulations. Had the 1912 statute barring false radio signals "of any
kind" remained in effect, the regulation of content on radio stations might
have taken a very different course. As it happened, Congress limited itself
to prohibiting false "distress signals."
Regulators of the radio waves seemed to have anticipated early on
how basic variations of falsely shouting fire in a theater would translate to
the new age of mass media. However, no one was prepared for the kind of
phenomena created in the late 1930s when CBS broadcast to an
unsuspecting nation a radio drama concerning an alien invasion.
8. ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302.
9. Id. § 7,37 Stat. 302,308.
10. ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
11. See id. §28,44 Stat. 1162,1172.
12. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
13. ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1091 (codified as amended at scattered sections 47 U.S.C.).
14. See id. § 325.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (1994).
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On the night of Sunday, October 30, 1938, Orson Welles, along with
cohorts from the Mercury Theater, performed a loose radio adaptation of
16War of the Worlds, an H.G. Wells novel concerning a Martian invasion.
WABC broadcast the program live from 8:00 to 9:00 P.M., 17 as well as the
CBS national network, consisting of over 151 stations throughout the
country.' The broadcast differed from previous typical radio drama styles
of the day. After an introductory speech by Orson Welles, explaining the
fictional nature of the broadcast, the program then simulated an announcer
who purported to bring the listeners live music from an orchestra in the
Park Plaza in New York, along with weather reports.' 9 The station then
played actual orchestral music, only to be interrupted by a separate
announcer with a breaking "news bulletin":
Ladies and gentlemen, we interrupt our program of dance music to
bring you a special bulletin from the Intercontinental Radio News. At
[twenty] minutes before 8 [P.M.], central time, Professor Farrell of the
Mount Jennings Observatory, Chicago, DIl., reports observing several
explosions of incandescent gas, occurring at regular intervals on the
planet Mars. 0
A brief return to music simulating a live orchestral performance
followed the news announcement. The pattern repeated itself with
updated breaking announcements reporting meteors striking the earth and
interviews with "astronomers" from Princeton Observatory.22 The
broadcast later moved to a simulated live newscast from the scene of the
meteor landing where a reporter described monsters emerging from the
debris and attacking.2 Sounds of crashing microphones and moments of
silence added to the realism.24 Reports of deaths along with interviews of
state militia officers and Washington officials were heard before the middle
break of the program, which reiterated the fictional nature of the broadcast
for the first time since its start.*2
Despite the announcements made before the end of the broadcast
16. See Radio Listeners in Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact, N.Y. TDMEs, Oct. 31,
1938, at 1.
17. See id. The time refers to Eastern Standard Time. The CBS affiliates throughout the
country broadcast the program simultaneously in their respective time zones.
18. See Ted Pease, I'll Take Martians over Media Illiteracy, HERALD J. (Utah), Nov. 10,
1996, at 10.
19. See Excerpts From the 'War' Broadcast, N.Y. TMs, Nov. 1, 1938, at 26.
20. Md
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id,
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intended to assure audiences of its fictional nature, panic gripped segments
of the nation.26 Listeners did not realize that they were hearing a
dramatization. Families rushed out of their homes, traffic jams clogged the
streets, church services were disrupted, and chaos ensued from people
trying to flee phantom Martians from the sky.27 The New York Times
reported that hospitals treated people for shock and hysteria, while police
switchboards were so swamped with calls that they could not conduct
regular business.2
CBS and Welles offered regrets that they had caused such a
reaction. Welles denied rumors that the program was a publicity stunt
26. See id.; FCC to Scan Script of 'War' Broadcast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1938, at 1.
Estimates on the size of the audience tuned in to War of the Worlds range from 6 to 12
million listeners. One Princeton University study concluded that as many as one million
people actually believed that what they heard was real. See SusAN J. DOUGLAS, LismIIING IN
165 (citing HADLEY CANTRIL, Tm INVASION FROM MARS (1940)). Other estimates claim that
up to 1,750,000 people were frightened enough by the broadcast to take some form of
action. See ORSON WELLES & P=rn BOGDANOViCH, Tis Is ORSON WELLES 346 (Jonathan
Rosenbaum ed., 1992). In terms of the share of the total radio audience, War of the Worlds
pulled in only about four percent of the available listeners. The extent of the panic could
have been far greater if the production had not been competing against the vastly popular
Edgar Bergen and Charlie McCarthy Show which brought in 34% of the audience that
evening. See Walter J. Beaupre, When Mars Invaded Radio: The Broadcast of the Century
(visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http:llusers.aol.comledwardelec/artwbOO7.html>.
27. See Radio Listeners in Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact, supra note 16, at 1.
28. See id. at 4. In an insightful essay entitled The Psychological Power of Radio, Tim
Crook suggests that the newspaper accounts of the event exaggerated the degree of the
panic. See Crook, supra note 6. Crook postulates that newspapers had ample motive to slant
the coverage because, by the late 1930s, the relatively new medium of radio had become a
threat to the print media in its competition for advertising revenue. See id. Indeed, the week
following the War of the Worlds broadcast, Time magazine admitted that: "[1]n the U.S. the
press, no friend to radio, treated it as a public outrage." "Boo!", TINE, Nov. 7, 1938, at 40.
Welles himself lamented the fact that newspapers ran headlines concerning lawsuits
totaling $12 million which supposedly stemmed from the broadcast. When such lawsuits
never materialized, Welles maintained that the papers made up the lawsuit headlines
because of competitive envy from radio advertising. However, nothing in Welles's
statements questioned the extent of the panic or the newspapers' coverage of the event
outside of the stories concerning the lawsuits. Welles even noted that 20 minutes into the
program, the radio control room was filled with "very bewildered cops." WELLES &
BoGDANOvIcH, supra note 26, at 18-19.
There are few independent historical accounts of the severity of the War of the Worlds
panic, except for the newspaper reports during the weeks following the broadcast. The
papers identified many frightened interviewees by name in their stories. The anecdotal
nature of such reporting makes it difficult to objectively assess the true extent and intensity
of the panic. While no confirmed deaths stemmed from the incident, at the very least, the
War of the Worlds hysteria forced many cities to divert considerable resources from their
law enforcement, media, and municipal services to cope with the fallout from the program.
29. In later years, Welles admitted that he "merrily anticipated" the type of reaction to
the broadcast, indicating that he intended to fool the public from the start. However, he also
claimed to be flabbergasted by the scale of the program's effect. "We began to realize,"
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designed to promote Mercury Theater productions. 0 He pointed to four
factors that should have tipped listeners off to reality: (1) the opening
announcement set the show one year in the future (1939); (2) the broadcast
took place during the regular Mercury Theater broadcast slot which was
announced and described in all the newspapers; (3) a total of four
announcements were made describing the fictional nature of the show, with
one such announcement falling in the middle of the broadcast; and (4) the
familiarity of the American myth regarding an invasion from Mars.
3 1
Welles further explained:
Far from expecting the radio audience to take the program as fact
rather than as a fictional presentation, we feared that the classic H. G.
Wells story, which has served as inspiration for so many moving
pictures, radio serials[,] and even comic strips might appear too old
fashioned for modem consumption. We can only suppose that the
special nature of radio, which is often heard in fragments, or in parts
disconnected from the whole, has led to this misunderstanding.
32
The incident was a clear indication of the power of radio and how it
differed from other media. Unlike films, people did not necessarily
experience the show from the start but rather listened in at various times to
different segments. As a result, many did not hear the strategically placed
announcements assuring the listeners that the show was fake. The listing in
the newspaper that advertised the show obviously did not have an
immediate impact, unlike the broadcast itself. The economic and political
zeitgeist of 1938 was the final ingredient which allowed a nation to believe
the warnings from their radios that the Martians were coming. 3
Welles noted, "as we plowed on with the destruction of New Jersey, that the extent of our
American lunatic fringe had been underestimated." WaLrs & BOGDANOVICH, supra note
26, at 18-19.
30. See FCC to Scan Script of 'War' Broadcast, supra note 26, at 26.
31. See id.
32. FCC to Investigate Mars Radio Program, AssocIAT.D PRESs (New York), Oct. 31,
1938, reprinted in (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http:lwww.war-of-the-worlds.orglRadiol
Newspapers/Oct3l/FCC.html>.
33. In 1938, Time magazine declared:
[Tihe only explanation for the badly panicked thousands-who evidently had
neither given themselves the pleasure of familiarizing themselves with the Wells's
famous book nor had the wit to confirm or deny the catastrophe by dialing another
station-is that recent concern over a possible European Armageddon has badly
spooked the U. S. public.
"Boo!", supra note 28, at 40. Although this off-the-cuff analysis by Time's editors was
adopted as common wisdom by several analysts, sociologists, and other dedicated readers of
the magazine, the fact remains that this explanation was hardly the only reason for the
phenomena associated with the program. Without more tangible evidence, it is dubious to
suggest that this was even the primary cause of the panic.
It is always appropriate to consider the reactions of society within the context of the
times that were in existence. However, Time gives too little credit to the cleverness of
Number 2]
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While the aforementioned provisions in the Radio Acts of 1912 and
1927 indicated that the FCC contemplated the possibility of using the radio
to send a false distress signal, it was clearly caught off guard by War of the
Worlds. The rise of radio networks now allowed broadcasts to be heard
simultaneously throughout the nation. The result was the first case of a
single broadcaster triggering a nationwide panic.
FCC Chairman Frank R. McNinch called the airing of the program
"regrettable," but the FCC was unsure of what steps to take. 4 A basic
obstacle that confronted the commissioners was the fact that no rule
seemed to apply. The problem had nothing to do with their primary duties
of preventing station interference or monopoly ownership within the
broadcast industry. This was clearly not a case of obscene programming,
nor could it even be termed indecent. Section 326 of the 1934 Act
explicitly prohibited the FCC from regulating the content of individual
programs by stating:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the [FCC]
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall
be promulgated or fixed by the [FCC] which shall interfere with the
right of free speech by means of radio communication.
35
The New York Times summed up the FCC's role by reporting: "The
usual practice of the [FCC] is not to investigate broadcasts unless formal
demands for an inquiry are made, but the [FCC] has the power, officials
pointed out, to initiate proceedings where the public interest seems to• • ,36
warrant official action." After receiving twelve formal protests against the
War of the Worlds program the day after it was performed, Chairman
McNinch promised prompt consideration of the matter.37 The majority
Welles and the show itself. To this day, it is remarkable how well the broadcast stands up in
terms of its level of realism in capturing the chaos of an unfolding "live news event," even
one as improbable as a Martian landing.
Probably the easiest explanation to explain the panic was the simple fact that, at the
time, nothing like War of the Words had ever been done. People were still unsure how to
approach a new medium that was increasingly dominating the distribution of news and
information. Since radio was the first electronic mass media, the public had widespread
access to it in their homes. At the time, few inventions were comparable to the radio (unlike
television, which came along well after the debates concerning radio's place in society).
When viewed in this context, it is easier to understand how people could be fooled, at least
once, when they had never before been fooled.
34. FCC Is Perplexed on Steps to Take, N.Y. TamEs, Nov. 1, 1938, at 16.
35. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652 § 326, 48 Stat. 1064, 1091. This is verbatim
language carried over from section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927. See Radio Act of 1927, ch.
169 § 29,44 Stat. 1162, 1172.
36. Washington May Act, N.Y. TIMS, Oct. 31, 1938, at 4.
37. See FCC Is Perplexed on Steps to Take, supra note 34, at 26.
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feeling within the FCC, however, was to avoid any hasty action, lest it be
construed as censoring program material.' s Commissioner T.A.M. Craven
made the following cautionary note:
[Tihe [FCC] should proceed carefully in order that it will not
discourage the presentation by radio of the dramatic arts. It is essential
that we encourage radio to make use of the dramatic arts and the artists
of this country. The public does not want a "spineless" radio.
It is also my opinion that, in any case, isolated instances of poor
programming service do not necessarily justify the revocation of a
station's license, particularly when such station39 has an otherwise
excellent record of good public service. I do not include in this
category, however, criminal action by broadcasting station licensees.4
At the time, if any pressure was to be put on stations in preventing
such a panic in the future, it would have to be done indirectly through the
FCC's practice of refusing to renew station licenses for programs or actions
that were not deemed to be in the "public interest."'' The public interest
cauldron was often used by the FCC to judge the total activities that a
station engaged in, even when they might have fallen outside the
parameters of an explicit regulatory ban. However, even though license
renewals were less certain for incumbent broadcasters in the 1930s than
they are today, some in the FCC indicated doubts as to how much weight it
would put on The War of the Worlds when determining if a station was
satisfying the public interest during a license renewal hearing.
Commissioner Paul E. Walker pointed out that, "'probably the broadcasters
are as anxious to straighten things out as anybody. ' ' 42 Commissioner
George Henry Payne struck a more actionable tone in proclaiming:
People who have material broadcast into their homes without warnings
have a right to protection. Too many broadcasters have insisted that
they could broadcast anything they liked, contending that they were
protected by the prohibition of censorship. Certainly when people are
injured morally, physically, spiritually[,] and psychically, they have
38. See id.
39. It is unclear if Commissioner Craven referred to any specific station in this remark.
It could be a reference to WABC-the station in New York where War of the Worlds
originated. However, given the fact that it was carried by a live simulcast over the CBS
radio network, any number of stations could have been singled out for airing the same
program. This fact further points out the difficulty that regulators faced in the age of
networks.
40. FCC Is Perplexed on Steps to Take, supra note 34, at 26.
41. See id. This New York Times article on November 1, 1938, indicates that such
renewals were issued every six months. See id. The term was later increased to every three
years and then to every five years. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c) (1994). Today, the renewal term
is every eight years following congressional modifications of section 307(d) of the
Communications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (Supp. Ill 1997).
42. FCC Is Perplexed on Steps to Take, supra note 34, at 26 (citation omitted).
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just as much right to complain as if the laws against obscenity and
indecency were violated.
4 3
Other commissioners refused to comment. The FCC promised an inquiry
and requested a copy of the War of the Worlds script from CBS in order to
study it.
44
The investigation concerning War of the Worlds coincided with a
broader FCC hearing into problems concerning network broadcasting as a
whole. Chairman McNinch invited the heads of the then three major
broadcasting networks to discuss the use of the news term "flash" in radio
programming. In explaining the reasons for the summit, Chairman
McNinch stated:
I have heard the opinion often expressed within the industry as well as
outside that the practice of using "flash," as well as "bulletin," is
overworked and results in misleading the public. It is hoped and
believed that a discussion on this subject may lead to a clearer
differentiation between bonafide news matter of first rank importance
and that which is of only ordinary importance or which finds place in
dramatics or advertising.
The concerned network heads expressed relief at the informal nature of the
summit and made a good faith agreement to confine the use of the term
"flash" in broadcasts to only those items of serious (and nonfictional)
importance.46
Shortly thereafter, Chairman McNinch delivered a speech to the
National Association of Broadcasters convention on November 19, 1938,
entitled "What Our Investigation Means to Broadcasters. ' 47 He suggested
that the best guidance on program standards would come from the public
opinion of the listeners, rather than the broadcasters or the FCC itself He
further stressed that broadcast station licensees were in the position of
trustees, with the American public being the fiduciaries of the trust.49 The
major networks carried Chairman McNinch's remarks live over the radio,
including CBS, the same network which broadcast War of the Worlds.'
43. Mars Monsters Broadcast Will Not Be Repeated, ASSOCIATED PRESs (Washington),
Nov. 1, 1938, reprinted in (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http:llwar-of-the-worlds.orglRadio/
Newspapers/NovOl/No-Repeat.html>.
44. See FCC to Scan Script of 'War' Broadcast, supra note 26, at 1.
45. Radio Chain Heads Called, INS (Washington), Nov. 7, 1938, reprinted in (visited
Sept. 21, 1999) <http://war-of-the-worlds.org/Radio/Newspapers/NovO7/Heads.htnl>.
46. See id.
47. See EDELMAN, supra note 3, at 83.
48. See id
49. See Address by Chairman Frank R. McNinch, FED. COMM. BAR 1., Nov. 1938, at
14.
50. See id
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If Chairman McNinch's position in dealing with the aftermath from
War of the Worlds favored self-regulation by the broadcast industry, those
of U.S. Senator Clyde L. Herring from Iowa represented the other side of
the spectrum. The day after the broadcast, Senator Herring stated that
Welles's drama was proof that radio needed "control by the government."
5
'
Furthermore, the Senator claimed that he had prepared a bill for the then
upcoming legislative session that would have allowed the FCC to screen
and veto every radio program before it was broadcast.52 Senator Herring's
remarks represented one of the most unabashed calls for direct government
control of the airwaves by a U.S. official in the electronic media age.
The previous years saw a rising chorus of criticism towards radio
programming, which was described by many as being increasingly
indecent and incendiary. 5  War of the Worlds brought the debate
concerning radio censorship to a new level of intensity.
Despite the often antagonistic relationships between newspapers and
radio, most of the print editorials tended to favor the self-regulation
approach. Among the more unequivocal editorials came from the New York
Daily News, excerpts of which stated,
[M]ail delivery yesterday morning brought 191 letters, and the bulk of
these concerned Sunday evening's nation-wide "invasion from Mars"
radio scare.
Practically all our correspondents were in a rage when they wrote.
About half of them were mad at the people who were hoaxed into
taking the broadcast seriously; the other half were mad at Orson
Welles, who put on the "War of the Worlds" radio rendition of H. G.
Wells's novel of the same title, for having done the job so vividly and
convincingly.
We can't work up a mad against either of these targets.
The only parties to the excitement that we're mad at are the [FCC],
for making such a fuss about it, and Senator Clyde L. Herring (Dem.,
Iowa), who has seized the incident as a pretext for renewing his drive
for government radio censorship.
We wish the FCC would relax and go back to sleep. We hope the
next Congress, and as many Congresses thereafter as necessary, will
smack flat all radio censorship bills with the avalanche of "NO's" they
51. FCC to Investigate Mars Radio Program, UNrD PnsS (Des Moines), Oct. 31,
1938, reprinted in (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http:llwar-of-the-worlds.orglRadio/
Newspapers/Oct3l/FCC.html>.
52. See id.
53. Among the most often cited examples include a 1937 broadcast involving Mae
West and Don Ameche portraying Adam and Eve in a Bible parody, as well as a 1938
Sunday show from Father Charles E. Coughlin in Detroit which critics described as being
anti-Semitic in nature.
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deserve in a free-speech, free-press, free-religion, free-assemblage
54
country.
Published sentiments such as these no doubt emboldened officials
within the FCC who favored the self-regulation approach. Congress did not
adopt Senator Herring's proposals nor those of any others who favored
broader and more direct government control over radio content.55
In the months that followed the rally against government restrictions
on programming, Senator Herring's stance on the issue developed more
flexibility and nuance. In March 1939, Senator Herring authored an article
entitled Is Radio Censorship Necessary?, where he stated:
There has been a reluctance on the part of government to impose
federal censorship, and it is quite certain that it will be resorted to only
if other means of bringing about voluntary censorship fail.
Just as I am a staunch believer in the capacity of business to run
itself and to set up, voluntarily, fair trade and labor practices for the
governing of industry by management, so I believe that the radio
industry is able to regulate itself.
The radio companies should voluntarily establish a code of ethics
binding upon all broadcasters. This would at once obviate the necessity
of further efforts at governmental control and, I believe, produce
results infinitely more satisfactory from the standpoint of both the
industry and the public....
One of the most important questions constantly before broadcasters
is: What should be allowable in public speeches, political and
otherwise, delivered over the radio? The broadcasting companies have
endeavored to keep a check on this type of radio presentation as well
as dramatic productions, which by their nature might be misleading to
radio listeners, such as Orson Welles['s] presentation of "The Men
from Mars," [sic] and the "Adam and Eve" [sic] sketch for which Mae
West has been so severely censored and for which, I understand, she
was only responsible for reading the lines. The scripts in both instances
were the products of other minds and ample opportunity should have
been afforded for the ascertaining of public reactions before the public
presentations were made.
5 6
In the debate over radio censorship that followed War of the Worlds,
54. Radio Must Not Be Censored, N.Y. DA.Y NEws, Nov. 3, 1938, editorial.
55. Not only were such proposals rejected, but it also should be noted that in searching
the indices of the Congressional Record for all years covering Clyde L. Herring's term as
Senator (1937-43), there is nothing to indicate that he even offered such a bill on the Senate
floor. One can only speculate as to why this was so. Perhaps the editorials of the newspapers
swayed the Senator and his allies, or, perhaps Senator Herring's statement about his drafted
bill was a mere posturing attempt to prod the FCC to take a more active role in the problems
concerning station programming.
56. Hon. Clyde L. Herring, Is Radio Censorship Necessary?, in RADIo CENsoRsHn'221,
222-24 (H.B. Summers ed., 1939).
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it seemed as though the proponents of self-regulation had clearly gained
the upper hand in both the halls of Congress and the FCC. Throughout the
debate, radio networks themselves did everything they could to show that
self-regulation could indeed work. This resulted in a period of
programming shaped by network executives who practically walked on
eggshells so as not to upset any potential radio critics. One periodical
observed at the time:
On guard against government censorship, radio has clamped its own
hand over its mouth in a self-censorship as rigid as, if not more rigid
than, anything the government could order.
The jitters began with Mae West's burlesque of the Garden of Eden,
and reached chronic proportions with Orson Welles's recent "War of
the Worlds" [sic] debacle. Today broadcasters are scared silly. Their
every decision is dictated by fear-fear of a club held over their heads
by a handful of political appointees in Washington, the [FCC], who, in
turn, are at the whim of any Nice Nelly in the country. 5
Popular radio entertainer Fred Allen wished to perform a humorous
commentary on his show concerning the War of the Worlds scare and the
reaction to it. His script contained the following:
In view of the recent happenings in radio, I think it would be better,
before we start, if I made a sort of announcement .... Ladies and
Gentlemen, before this radio presentation starts, I would like to
announce that this is a comedy program. Any dialogue or sound-effects
heard during the next hour will be purely imaginary and will have no
relation to any living sounds. If you hear a phone ringing, like this
(telephone rings), do not pick up your receiver. If you hear a knock,
like this (door knock), do not run to open your door. Ignore everything
you hear on this program. Just sit back and relax. Nothing is going to
happen. And to prove that the offering is positively crammed with
nothing, we plunge instantly into the latest news of the week. 
5
Allen never got to deliver his disclaimer. The program editor for NBC cut
the sequence, feeling that the War of the Worlds nerves were still too raw
at the time.59 If radio had not become "spineless," it had at least willingly
jettisoned a few of its vertebrae in order to head off the prospect of full
government control.
The FCC completed its formal investigation into the War of the
Worlds in just over one month from the date of the broadcast. On
December 5, 1938, the FCC issued a press release regarding its decision on
the matter. The release itself concisely summarized the further events and
conclusions surrounding the investigation, and is thus reprinted here in full:
57. Earl Sparling, Radio Gets the Jitters, AM. MAG., Mar. 1939, at 42.
58. Id. at 43
59. See id.
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The [FCC] announced today that in its judgment steps taken by
[CBS] since the Orson Welles 'Mercury Theater on the Air' [sic]
program on October 30 are sufficient to protect the public interest.
Accordingly complaints received regarding this program will not be
taken into account in considering the renewals of licenses of stations
which carried the broadcast.
60
The [FCC] stated that, while it is regrettable that the broadcast
alarmed a substantial number of people, there appeared to be no
likelihood of a repetition of the incident and no occasion for action by
the [FCC].
In reaching this determination, the [FCC] had before it a statement
by Mr. W. B. Lewis, Vice President in charge of [pirograms, of the
[CBS], expressing regret that some listeners 'mistook fantasy for fact'
and saying in part, 'In order that this may not happen again, the
Program Department hereafter will not use the technique of a
simulated news broadcast within a dramatization when the
circumstances of the broadcast could cause immediate alarm to
numbers of listeners.'
The [FCC] had also heard a transcript of the program and had been
informed regarding a number of communications concerning it. It was
made known that the [FCC] received 372 protests against the
broadcast, while 255 letters and petitions favoring it were received.
Counting those who signed petitions, those who expressed themselves
as favorable to the broadcast numbered approximately 350.61
The press release concluded the investigation into War of the Worlds.
However, the broadcast would continue to reverberate in subsequent
• 62
decades in the debate concerning hoax regulations.
III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST: POST-WAR OF THE WORLDS
DEVELOPMENTS AND EXAMPLES
Although no direct regulatory controls came out of the War of the
Worlds scare, that is not to say that the FCC forgot the incident. Many
subsequent policy statements made it clear that the FCC looked down upon
broadcasting generally deceptive materials. In 1960, the FCC met for an en
60. Although the FCC did not revoke any licenses over the War of the Worlds incident,
its reference to licenses of stations that carried the broadcast suggests that it considered
individual stations to be ultimately responsible for the programming of their affiliated
networks under a form of respondeat superior theory.
61. Commission's Decision as to Orson Welles'[s] Broadcast, FM. COMM. BAR J.,
Nov. 1938, at 15-16.
62. Years later, Welles was once again on a radio network reading from the works of
Walt Whitman when an announcement that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor interrupted the
broadcast. Much of the audience recalled the War of the Worlds broadcast, suspected that
Welles was up to his old tricks, and refused to believe that the announcement was in fact
real. President Roosevelt later wired Welles to suggest the inherent dangers involved in
"crying wolf." See WELLES & BOGDANOVICH, supra note 26, at 20.
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banc programming inquiry to discuss the current state of broadcast
programming in the wake of scandals involving fixed quiz shows and
allegations of payola. The FCC used the occasion to make the broader
observation that:
Prior to the en banc hearing, the [FCC] had made its position clear
that, in fulfilling its obligation to operate in the public interest, a
broadcast station is expected to exercise reasonable care and prudence
with respect to its broadcast material in order to assure that no matter is
broadcast which will deceive or mislead the public.
63
While specifically proposed regulations concerning payola and
predetermined contests were soon forthcoming, the FCC did not address
the issue of possible deceptions within the context of dramatic shows.
Almost thirty years after the War of the Worlds broadcast, the FCC, in
a somewhat cursory manner, issued a statement that briefly mentioned the
problem of dramatic hoaxes. In February 1966, after receiving numerous
complaints on the matter, the FCC adopted a public notice concerning the
handling of contests and promotions that adversely affect the public
interest.64 The notice primarily concerned itself with contests and
promotions that caused disruptions-such as treasure hunts, which resulted
in annoying phone calls by listeners to uninvolved third parties, traffic
congestion, or damage to property necessitating the divergence of police
from their other duties.6 Although most of the examples cited did not
involve hoaxes or deceptive behaviors, the FCC included the following
among the list of promotions deemed to have an adverse effect on the
public interest:
The broadcast of "scare" announcements or headlines which either
are untrue or are worded in such a way as to mislead and frighten the
public: e.g., a sudden announcement delivered in a tone of excitement
to the effect that "amoebas" were invading a certain city, implying that
the amoebas were dangerous creatures.6
The FCC concluded the statement by summarizing that: "[c]ontests or
promotions which result in consequences such as these raise serious
question as to the sense of responsibility of the broadcast licensee
involved."6'
63. Report and Statement of Policy Res: en bane Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C.
2303,2304(1960).
64. The FCC's notice did not list any references to the specific instances involving
complaints or the stations involved. As a result, it is difficult to trace the surrounding
circumstances that prompted the policy notice in a more precise manner.
65. See Contests and Promotions Which Adversely Affect the Public Interest, Public
Notice, 2 F.C.C.2d 464, 6 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 671 (1966).
66. Id. at 464.
67. Id.
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In 1974, the specter of the War of the Worlds resurfaced when station
WPRO in Providence, Rhode Island, broadcast an updated version of the
drama that struck close to the original War of the Worlds script but
substituted location names that were more familiar to Providence citizens.
WPRO broadcast the show on October 30, 1974, the same night as the
original War of the Worlds performed thirty-six years earlier. Although one
might think that by 1974 the American public would have been more
skeptical about news reports of a Martian invasion, the show still managed
to panic many listeners. Even though the level of anxiety caused by
WPRO's War of the Worlds was not nearly as great as when Orson Welles
performed it, the program still generated over one hundred calls to the
station and over eighty calls to the police.6 The fire department, local
telephone company, as well as other television and radio stations
complained that they were overwhelmed by the number of calls concerning
"the disaster."
' 69
Letters to the FCC told of tales concerning people who drove at high
speeds in order to get home and protect their families while altering their
normal travel routes in order to avoid the areas mentioned in the show. One
letter admitted: "We are not alarmists or gullible people but in the hour that
we listened we were so afraid we called neighbors and our parents to warn
them....70
Despite WPRO's defense that the level of damage caused was slight
and that various announcements were made both before and during the
program that informed listeners of its dramatic nature, the FCC issued a
71formal reprimand to the station. WPRO also claimed that there was no
specific FCC policies that prevented them from airing dramas such as War
of the Worlds. The FCC used the occasion to clarify its public notice of
1966:
68. Unlike Welles's broadcast, WPRO's program was only broadcast to the community
that could reach their Rhode Island signal. The CBS network carried Orson Welles's
broadcast throughout the country. WPRO aired the show from 11:00 P.M. until midnight,
while Welles's drama began at 8:00 P.M. (East Coast Time), a time when more listeners
were awake. In an era when people had less entertainment choices (e.g., television), a larger,
less fractured audience tuned into radio.
69. See Complaints Concerning Capital Cities Comm., Inc., East Providence, R.I.,
Complaint, 54 F.C.C.2d 1035, 1035 n.1, 34 Rad. Reg.2d (P & 1) 1016, 1016 n.1 (1975)
[hereinafter Complaint].
70. Id. at 1037 n.5.
71. Id. at 1038. To the observers who would be more skeptical about broadcasts
concerning Martian invasions, the exchange offered moments of unintended humor, such as
this FCC retort to an attempted defense by WPRO: "As to your statement that 'The War of
the Worlds' [sic] caused no gathering of people at 'the landing site' it would be reasonable
to assume that the last place that those people misled by the broadcast would want to gather
is at the Martian landing site" a:I at 1037.
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In [the station's response] you state that as far as you are aware,
there is no rule or policy directly in point that purports to establish
standards governing the content of radio dramas; and that the [FCC]'s
Public Notice, 'Contests and Promotions Which Adversely Affect the
Public Interest,' deals with the questions of disruption and alarm
caused by "contests and other promotional ventures," but does not
purport to deal with serious radio drama. Although the Public Notice to
which you refer is couched in terms of contests and promotions, it does
serve to indicate types of broadcasts adverse to the public interest An
example cited in that Notice is as follows:
The broadcast of "scare" announcements or headlines which
either are untrue or are worded in such a way as to mislead and
frighten the public: e.g., a sudden announcement delivered in the
tone of excitement to the effect that "amoebas" were invading a
certain city, implying that the amoebas were dangerous
creatures.
Parts of the "War of the Worlds" [sic] broadcast appears to fall
ivithin the axample above.
Although various FCC officials expressed great concerns over Orson
Welles's War of the Worlds in 1938 and implied that broadcasters should
discourage such programming, the WPRO reprimand letter represented the
first time that the FCC had formally gone on record to state that the War of
the Worlds style of broadcasting was specifically adverse to the public
interest.
Commissioner Abbott Washburn offered a brief dissenting statement
concerning the decision to reprimand WPRO. Washburn wrote:
Anytime the [FCC] intrudes into the presentation of a radio or
television drama it should do so with the utmost caution.
If there is any doubt as to whether the listening public could
recognize this program for what it was, a radio drama, I believe the
[FCC] should avoid an official sanction against the licensee. Here the
number of complaints was not large and the precautions taken by the
licensee were not in my opinion unreasonable. I therefore dissent.
Despite the reprimand, WPRO's broadcasting license remained intact.
Actual instances of a station's license being jeopardized for participating in
a broadcast hoax are rare; however, a few past cases are worth noting.
In 1975, station KTLK-FM in Denver had its license renewal period
shortened to one year in part because it broadcast false weather reports that
the announcers knew had no factual basis. The FCC distinguished cases of
willful distortions from biased news judgments. In its report on KTLK's
license renewal hearing, it stated:
This activity, albeit on a lower plane, falls on the periphery of the type
72. Id. at 1035-36 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 1038 (Commissioner Washburn, dissenting).
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of "nonfact" reporting we referred to as "staged", or "pseudo-evenf' in
Democratic National Convention Television Coverage.74 In that case
we said that " .. . we do not sit to review the broadcaster's news
judgment, [or] the quality of his news.. ." On the other hand we are
concerned with a willful distortion of news. All that takes this
licensee's conduct from the core of the "willful distortion" to which we
were above referring is that there is no evidence that the licensee knew
the actual temperatures and, for motive, warped that information, and
although we have said that "[we] do not sit as a review body of the
'truth' concerning news events," where, as here, there is the clearest
evidence of reckless disregard for truth in a licensee's own news
practices and the broadcast in no way smacks of a "commentary" type
ofpresentation, public interest questions are raised.
75
The action against KTLK stemmed from additional factors such as
the promotion of a lottery (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1304), and the
violation of the FCC's rules regarding leaving the station's transmitter
unattended.76 However, the fact that the FCC singled out the false weather
74. The FCC's reference to the coverage of the Democratic National Convention refers
to a 1969 report concerning the possible scope of FCC jurisdiction over allegations of staged
events during news coverage of the Chicago riots outside the convention halls in 1968.
Allegations included news crews encouraging protesters to confront the police as cameras
began to roll, a cameraman gathering together burning trash in a pile and then deliberately
lit a "Welcome to Chicago" sign afire in order to film it for dramatic effect, and an allegedly
injured protester holding a bandage to his head as he was being filmed but later dropped the
bandage and walked away as soon as the cameras stopped. See Complaints Concerning
Network Coverage of the Democratic National Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 16 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 791 (1969).
75. Application of Action Radio, Inc. for Renewal of License of Radio Station KTLK,
Denver, Colo., Decision, 51 F.C.C.2d 803, para. 13, 33 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 51 (1975)
(footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis added). The line that separates news distortions
from false news reports rising to the level of hoaxes is often difficult to ascertain. Specifying
such distinctions could be a topic unto itself. Generally speaking however, a hoax is more
likely to cause listeners to take action, while news distortions will not affect an otherwise
passive listener. Additionally, the hoax is perpetrated primarily for the purposes of
mischievous entertainment, whereas news distortions revolve around the shaping of
information. For the purposes of surveying broadcast hoax law, it shall suffice to point out
that the FCC attempted to make such distinctions. See Amendment of Part 73 of the FCC's
Rules Regarding Broadcast Hoaxes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 6 F.C.C.R. 6935,
6935 n.3 (1991). Also, one should distinguish between news staging, wherein the
broadcaster instigates a real and actual news event that would not have otherwise occurred,
and news hoaxes, which report on events that have not occurred in fact. For more general
information on this aspect of the discussion, see Complaint Concerning the CBS Program
'The Selling of the Pentagon," 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 21 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 912 (1971);
Complaint by Mrs. J.R. Paul, Houston, Tex. Concerning Fairness Doctrine Re Network's
Coverage of President's Vietnam Address, 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 20 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1223
(1969); Complaint Covering CBS Program, "Hunger in America!' [sic], 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 17
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 674 (1969); Complaints Concerning Network Coverage of the
Democratic National Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 15 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 791 (1969).
76. See Application of Action Radio Inc., for Renewal of License of Radio Station
KTLK, Denver, Colo., Decision, 51 F.C.C.2d 803, para. 2, 33 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 51
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incident in the license renewal hearing and grouped it in the same category
of behaviors such as promoting a lottery, along with its concerns over the
inadequate supervision of station operations, clearly indicated the FCC's
indirect censoring power under the "public interest" rubric when a
broadcaster disseminated knowingly false information.
Notably, the FCC did not revoke the KTLK license. It merely
shortened KTLK's license period to one year, after which the station would
resubmit its application to an additional license hearing.7 Even when
program content is deemed to be against the public interest, the FCC
remains sensitive to the specter of censorship and will often refrain from
revoking a license in its entirety unless such problems are continuous. In
1980, however, a broadcast hoax managed to play a significant role in
getting a station's license taken away for good.
In 1974, station KIKX-FM in Tucson, Arizona, designed a promotion
'centering around a staged kidnapping of their new morning disc jockey
Arthur Gropen. The original plan called for Gropen to disappear from a
remote broadcast site and reappear in Miami. The general idea had been
devised with the help of Dennis Forsythe, the station's general manager.
On Saturday, January 19, 1974, the program director and news personnel
reported regularly scheduled newscasts concerning Gropen's kidnapping.
Details of a suspect profile and vehicle were used, along with a fake police
sound bite. Forsythe was at a golf tournament that weekend and had no
contact with the station regarding the execution of the promotion.
The public flooded the phone lines calling the station and the police
about the incident. Upon learning of the hoax, police complained to the
station that the gimmick was tying up their phone lines. A local TV station
then got wind of the incident and announced the kidnapping as a hoax.
Unfazed, KIKX broadcast a rebuttal, insisting that the kidnapping was in
fact genuine. Despite growing concern among the station's staff as to the
direction of the promotion, the program director allowed it to continue.
When Forsythe was contacted over the weekend about the situation, he was
not told about the complaints by the police. As a result, he authorized the
promotion to continue but directed that the term "kidnapping" not be used
and that no reference to the promotion be used in the station's newscasts.
It was not until Forsythe arrived back at the station on Monday that
he learned of the details surrounding the incident. KIKX had broadcast that
(1975).
77. In the course of the following year, KILK managed to correct and prevent the
violations that the FCC brought to the station's attention. The license of KTLK was then
reinstated to its full term. See Application by Action Radio, Inc., Denver, Colo. for renewal
of License for Station KTLK, 62 F.C.C.2d 349,349 (1976).
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Gropen had disappeared for three consecutive days. After speaking to the
police, Forsythe called John Walton, owner and President of Walton
Broadcasting, Inc., the company that in turn owned the station's license.
After Forsythe gave Walton a brief sketch of the incident, Walton felt he
could trust him to handle the situation and made no further inquiries. On
Tuesday, January 22, Forsythe learned that the FCC was going to
investigate the stunt. KIKX officially canceled the promotion the following
day and repeatedly broadcast messages from Forsythe and Walton,
apologizing to the listeners and police.7&
The FCC conducted the license renewal hearing for KKX in 1976.
Several rule violations were listed against the station including: a failure to
log commercial spots properly, technical violations concerning
maintenance of its transmitter, failure to maintain an effective equal
employment opportunity program, and a concern that Walton did not
properly supervise the station management as an absentee owner who
attempted to run the station from outside of Arizona. However, the most
serious charge against the station was the Gropen kidnapping hoax.
Administrative law judge Thomas B. Fitzpatrick ruled that renewing a
license to Walton Broadcasting would "not serve the public interest,
convenience and necessity."79
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Fitzpatrick rejected the contention
that the hoax was a spur of the moment stunt by the program director.
Evidence pointed to the fact that some of station's personnel were told of
the kidnapping plan eleven days before its execution. Judge Fitzpatrick
underscored Forsythe's decision to remain at the golf tournament while the
station carried out the hoax as evidence of a lack of managerial concern in
the station's operation. Summarizing the reasons for his decisions, Judge
Fitzpatrick stated:
The broadcast of the hoax kidnapping on newscasts and continually
during the broadcast day, represents a type of station operation which
one would have hoped that broadcast industry had long since relegated
to total oblivion. Certainly, station promotions have their place in
appropriate broadcast operation. However, such promotions must not
be permitted to deteriorate to the point of deception and chicanery, as
was the case here. This hoax on the listening public was conceived by
Forsythe in a cynical fashion and played upon the credulity and
humanity of the KTKX listeners. That the public was both shocked and
concerned by the purported "kidnapping" is amply evidenced by the
numerous phone calls to the station and to the police. The program
78. See Application of Walton BrdCsL, Inc. (EK<=), Tucson, Ariz. for Renewal of
License, Decision, 78 F.C.C.2d 857, paras. 5-12, 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1233 (1980)
[hereinafter Arizona License Decision].
79. l- at para. 2.
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format of KIKX was such that it catered to a young and impressionable
audience. All the announcements of the "kidnapping" had the ring of
authenticity. The fact that a number of people questioned police officer
Sedlmayr while he was attending the University of Arizona basketball
game Saturday evening evidences the depth of their concern of what
they thought was the kidnapping of a popular disc jockey. Forsythe's
arrogant disregard of the sensibilities of the listening public cannot be
too strenuously condemned. This whole incident was unnecessary and
unpardonable, and the licensee, which delegated to Forsythe
supervision over the operation of station KIKX, must be held
responsible. Only by holding a licensee responsible for the operation
and management of a station and only by insisting that it bear the
responsibility for the actions of its station manager can there be any
reasonable assurance of responsible station operation and management
in the public interest.!
Furthermore, Judge Fitzpatrick categorically rejected Walton's
argument that the event should not be categorized as a deception because
the station had planned to eventually reveal the truth from the idea's
inception. The terse response to this defense pointed out:
The significant fact is that the hoax kidnapping announcements were
broadcast on the news and on other programs and the public was not
informed that, in fact, it was a hoax, for a period of five days. To argue
that one can deceive the public, and incite their concern by
misrepresenting that a kidnapping had occurred and that it is not
staging the news because it was later to be announced that Gropen was
safe and sound in Florida, is specious and is rejected. 8
Walton appealed to the FCC, which denied the appeal in 1980. The
ruling pointed to the lack of control that Walton exhibited over his staff
which allowed the hoax to continue. The decision not only emphasized the
concern over broadcast hoaxes, but also the policy of encouraging license
holders to have a more hands-on approach as to how their stations are run.82
80. Walton Broadcasting, Inc. (KIKX), Tuscon, Ariz. for Renewal of License, Initial
Decision of Administrative Law Judge Thomas B. Fitzpatrick, 78 F.C.C.2d 880, at para. 5,
34 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) (1976) (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at para. 7(footnote omitted).
82. See Application of Walton Broadcasting, Inc. (KIKX), Tucson, Ariz. for Renewal
of License, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 440, para. 6, 48 Rad. Reg.2d (P
& F-) 1006 (1980) [hereinafter Arizona License Memorandum Opinion and Order]. The FCC
also raised serious concerns regarding the lack of equal employment opportunity (EEO) or
"affirmative action" programs at KIKX. However, this was not a deciding factor in the
choice to deny the license. The FCC stated in the decision:
We also find that Walton's failure to have an effective EEO program, its failure to
comply with the [FCC]'s EEO Rules during the 1971-1974 license term, and the
misstatements in its 1974 renewal application with respect to the effectiveness of
its EEO program, absent consideration of Walton's postdesignation EEO efforts,
would constitute a separate and independent ground for denial of its renewal
application. Because we hold that the licensee's failure to exercise adequate
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In its appeal, Walton Broadcasting cited decisions regarding WJPD,
Inc.," and Janus Broadcasting Co., 4 as examples of similar conduct which
did not result in a license revocation. The FCC distinguished these cases
from the KTKX incident. The WJPD, Inc. case involved a station manager
who engaged in fraudulent billing practices for four years because the
licensee failed to monitor the station's billing. However, the FCC found
that there was no clear indication of misconduct to the license holder who
had taken good faith steps to prevent such actions. While the licensee
showed a lack of diligence, his failure to uncover the station manager's
actions did not rise to gross negligence and his subsequent preventive
measures mitigated in his favor.
The Janus Broadcasting Co. investigation concerned a single instance
of misconduct involving a rigged contest on station WGNE-FM in Panama
City, Florida. The actual licensees were unaware of the contest when it
began and ordered it to cease as soon as they learned that it was in fact
fixed. During the initial inquiry by the FCC, one of the licensees mislead
investigators by claiming that he was not aware of any instances of rigged
contests. He soon recanted his misstatement, however, claiming that he did
not intend to deceive the FCC but decided to take the easy way out and
avoid admitting what he felt was a minor error.8
The FCC's decision regarding KIKX distinguished Janus
Broadcasting Co. by pointing out that the station in that case had only a
single incident of misconduct and misrepresentation, which did not involve
any serious repercussions." In contrast, KIKX staged a hoax that lasted
several days, interfered with police operations, and alarmed the audience
The hoax did not stop in light of concerns from police, callers, and local
control with respect to the hoax incident is a sufficient ground for denial of
renewal, we need not reach the question whether its postlicense term EEO record
should be considered in mitigation of our finding that renewal denial was
warranted on the EEO issue.
Arizona License Decision, 78 F.C.C.2d 857, para. 4, 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1233
(1980).
83. Revocation of the License WJPD, Inc. 79 F.C.C.2d 115, 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
1423 (1980).
84. Frederick Leonard Lindholm, Donald George McCoy, General Partners and David
Arvid Johnson, Limited Partner, d/b/a Janus Brdcst. Co. for Renewal of License of Radio
Station WGNE Panama City Beach, Fla. and for Renewal of Main & SCA License of Radio
Station WGNE-FM Panama City, Fla., Decision, 78 F.C.C.2d 788, 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
805 (1980) [hereinafter Decision].
85. See id, at paras. 6-7.
86. Arizona License Memorandum Opinion and Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 440, para. 6, 48
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1006.
87. See id.
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television stations.!
Notably, the decision to uphold the license revocation of KIKX was
not unanimous. Commissioner Anne P. Jones issued a dissent, joined by
Commissioner James H. Quello. Commissioner Jones stated that she felt
the FCC:
Overreacted to a brief ill-conceived promotion conducted by this
licensee some seven years ago. The promotion surely deserves
condemnation, but I can not agree that it justifies nonrenewal of this
license.
In a case such as this the operative question is whether the facts
show that the licensee cannot be trusted in the future to operate in the
public interest. In my view the facts here make no such showing. At
most, they indicate that over a period of about four days Walton's
supervision and control of KKX was inadequate to prevvent [sic] an
ill-conceived promotion which caused some concern to the public and
the police. The licensee has now tightened his control to guard against
any such deviation from operation in the public interest in the future.
I do not condone either this promotion or the slippage of
supervision and control which allowed it to occur. I cannot, however,
agree that this brief, apparently aberrant operation of KIKX justifies
nonrenewable of its license.8
The dissent points to the fact that decisions regarding how to approach
broadcast hoaxes were not unanimous. However, in light of the knowledge
of the deception by the station's management, coupled with a lack of
diligence by the licensee to take preventive steps, KIKX became one of the
few stations to have its license permanently revoked due to a broadcast
hoax.
A similar case involving WMJX-FM in Miami closely followed the
KJKX incident. After being admonished by the FCC in 1973 for engaging
in fraudulent contests.90 the station broadcast a series of news reports
stating that disc jockey Greg Austin was lost in the Bermuda Triangle. The
reports continued after station personnel were aware of Austin's safe
landing on the Florida coast. However, the station's news reporter was
instructed to keep running the story of the disappearance in order to
88. Seeid.atpara.5.
89. Id. at 443-44 (Commissioner Jones, dissenting).
90. One particular contest that initiated an FCC investigation involved a promotion
called "Magnum One," where the station led contest winners to believe that they had
received part of a corporation with valuable assets. It turned out that the corporation itself
was a shell with little or no assets. Following the FCC's admonishment, the station made
assurances to the FCC that steps would be taken to prevent such deceptive practices in the
future. See Investigation of Bartell Brdcst. of Fla., Inc. (Station WMYQ-FM) Miami Beach,
Fla. Concerning Contest, 51 F.C.C.2d 2 (1974).
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promote the "Find Greg Austin Contest."'"
Administrative Law Judge Thomas B. Fitzpatrick, the same judge
who revoked the license of KIKX, presided over the license renewal
hearing of WMJX. Once again, Judge Fitzpatrick refused to renew the
license in light of the station's misconduct9
In upholding Fitzpatrick's decision to revoke the license of WMJX,
the FCC stated:
The lack of evidence regarding actual harm, and the fact that numerous
prizes [for the deceptive contests] were actually awarded do not
constitute mitigating circumstances. Those cases in which the [FCC]
either imposed a short term renewal or issued an admonishment
involved only one contest irregularity. The record here, by comparison,
demonstrates false newscasts in connection with one contest promotion
... and repeated misconduct in nine contests over a two year period.9
The FCC further noted that the hoaxes and fake contests involved the
station's top management and the licensee's parent corporation delegated
top management's authority.94 As to the station's claim that it should
receive First Amendment protection for good faith mistakes, the FCC
retorted, "it is sufficient to note that these were not good faith mistakes.
WMJX, Inc., has already received one lesser sanction, and its failure even
to abide by express representations made to the [FCC] chills any
expectation that the licensee can be trusted in the future."
95
Attorneys for WMJX also attempted to compare its behavior with that
of Denver's KTLK and the false weather reports broadcast.9 They noted
that KTLK merely received a shortened license renewal period for its
conduct, while the FCC revoked WMJX's license for what was being
described as similar behavior.97 The FCC quickly distinguished WMJX's
case from others by observing:
The [FCC] decisions and First Amendment cases upon which
WMJX, Inc., relies do not preclude a denial of renewal[.] In Action
Radio, Inc. the licensee's meritorious programming record, when
weighed against the gravity of the misconduct, was deemed sufficient
to allow a short-term renewal. WMJX, Inc., never requested
consideration of its programming as a mitigating factor, and the
misconduct here was far more egregious. To the extent WMJX, Inc.,
91. Application of WMJX, Inc. WMJX-FM Miami, Fla. for Renewal of License,
Decision, 85 F.C.C.2d 251, paras. 1-16,48 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1339 (1981).
92. See id. at para. 2.
93. See id at para. 37.
94. See id. at para. 39.
95. Id. at para. 41 (footnote omitted). The lesser sanction that the FCC referred to is the
admonishment stemming from the 'agnum One" contest. See supra note 90.
96. See id.
97. See id.
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relies upon the proposition announced in Bluegrass Broadcasting
Corp., regarding the unforeseen aberrational conduct of a long term
and trusted employee, we note that the licensee was more than once
alerted to possible contest irregularities during the period Como,
Logan, and Clifton managed the station. Oil Shale Broadcasting
Company, is also distinguishable. It involved one contest which was
prearranged by station employees, with a negligent failure in
supervision and control and no knowledge on the part of the principals.
The record here, in contrast, demonstrates numerous contest
irregularities over a protracted period of time, involvement therein by
top management of the station and the licensee's parent corporation. It
also involved actual knowledge on the part of a corporate officer who
was responsible for station operations and who was grossly negligent
in failing to exercise minimal supervision and control over the various
contests and promotions."
The decision to punish a station for hoaxes or deceptive incidents
turns on very fact intensive and contextual considerations. KIKX and
WMJX should be contrasted with another "ddnapping" incident involving
station KITE in San Antonio, Texas. The license holder of KITE had
helped to stage an on-air kidnapping of its morning show host as part of a
station promotion. During its license renewal hearing, the licensee argued
that no one listening to the broadcast could have taken it seriously.9
During a challenge to the license renewal, the FCC's finding reinforced
that contention:
Toni Walsh, the female member of the Tom and Toni Show, was
abducted by the Happy Jazz Band of San Antonio, amid much tooting
of trumpets, flashing of hired photographers' cameras, and general
hilarity. The stunt had been broadly hinted at all week, and it was
carried off as a stunt, not as a real experience.
Our review of the results of an investigation conducted by the
[FCC]'s staff does not bear out [the challenger's] contentions that the
promotional stunt created widespread disorder, necessitating the
diversion of police from other duties. The [FCC] received a total of
two complaints regarding the licensee's prank-one from the
petitioner and the other from an individual listener, who only
momentarily thought the "kidnapping" was real. Furthermore, in
response to [FCC] staff inquiries, the police departments of Terrell
Hills and San Antonio reported that the "kidnapping" did not disrupt
their normal routines. No police personnel were diverted from regular
duties. In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the petitioner has failed
98. Ua at para. 41 (footnotes omitted).
99. See Application of Doubleday Brdcst. Co., for Renewal of License for Station
KITE, San Antonio, Tex., Memorandum and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 333, para. 16, 35 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 775 (1975). Although the precise date of the incident was not provided,
based on the date of KITE's license renewal motions, the kidnapping most likely occurred
sometime between 1972 and 1974.
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to show that KITE's promotional gimmick adversely affected the
public interest.10
Contrasting the KITE promotion from those involving KIKX and WMJX
provides a list of factors that would cause the FCC to be more likely to take
action. First, the broadcast must be inherently believable. Pranks that are
obvious in nature will not trigger disciplinary action. Particularly
significant in that respect is the amount of disruption that was actually
caused to a communities' law enforcement or emergency services. In the
context of hoaxes, the "public interest" is often defined in terms of the
level of intrusion imposed upon third parties such as police, firemen, or
traffic controllers. However, WMJX shows that actual harm may not
always be necessary in the case of repeated violations involving deceptive
contests or promotions. Single instances of misconduct will not likely
invoke the FCC's wrath when no actual harm is done, much like the Janus
Broadcasting incident. However, when a station continues proscribed
conduct after it has been warned, the lack of harm caused is less likely to
be an effective defense. In such instances, the FCC looks to the level of
involvement by upper management and how it reflects on their diligence in
operating the station in a hands-on manner consistent with stated public
policy. The KIKX and WMJX cases contained such circumstances that
triggered the FCC's extra scrutiny and thus harsher punishment. In spite of
those notable instances, it is rare for the FCC to revoke a station's license
for engaging in a broadcast hoax.
IV. DEREGULATION: REDEFThING THE APPROACH?
Somewhat ironically, the actions against KIKX and WMJX came at
the starting cusp of a general trend towards the deregulation of radio. What
began in 1978 as an informal study of the possibility of radio deregulation
culminated in official proceedings by the FCC in 1981 to eliminate
regulations deemed to be unnecessary, starting with areas such as program
log requirements, restrictions on commercial time, and nonentertainment
program guidelines. A general policy of good faith by the broadcaster to
serve the public interest in its discretion replaced the unnecessary
regulation. The FCC explained:
In taking the actions outlined above we have relieved radio
broadcasters of substantial burdens but have also given them added
responsibility-the responsibility to determine how best to serve their
public without the [FCC] providing detailed requirements on how to
go about doing so. We are confident that they are up to the task before
100. Id. at paras. 16-17 (citation omitted).
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them.10
1
Broadcast deregulation continued throughout the 1980s concerning
all areas of the industry, including programming guidelines. In 1985, the
FCC decided to eliminate the official policy adopted in 1966 concerning
contests and promotions that adversely affect the public interest. In
explaining the reasons for eliminating the policy, the FCC pointed to state
laws that were adequate alternatives to deal with any problems:
[Clontests and promotions resulting in traffic congestion or other
public disorder can all be ably handled at the local level through both
civil means (e.g., actions for trespass, personal injury, private nuisance,
invasion of privacy, or injunctive relief) and criminal means (e.g.,
disturbing the peace or public nuisance), possibly resulting in damages
or fines. t z
Additionally, the policy change pointed to the fact that having to caution a
station from announcing an obvious hoax, such as an invasion by amoebas,
was an "overreaction" on the FCC's part and constituted "regulatory
overkil.'
03
However, an important footnote in the policy change announcement
was a clear indication that stations would not be allowed to engage in an
"anything goes" style of programming. A caveat to the amoeba example
reemphasized that "a current broadcast of a program such as "War of the
Worlds", [sic] without cautionary language, would violate [FCC]
policies-i.e., both our general policy requiring licensees to program their
stations in the public interest, and our more specific policy against
deliberate distortion or falsification of programming."'10
4
The juxtaposition of this footnote with the description of having to
caution against an amoeba invasion as an "overreaction" reemphasized the
policy touched upon in the KITE renewal hearing-that a broadcast hoax
must be reasonably believable before it will prompt the FCC to act. The
problem remained: what might be believable to one generation or
community might not be believable to another. In the 1990s, many would
scoff in amusement when they hear a radio show reporting a Martian
attack. However, America in 1938 was more susceptible to believe such a
story in the midst of the Depression and war anxieties. The War of the
Worlds broadcast by WPRO showed that certain communities were still
prone to such fears in the mid-1970s. Could such a prank be successfully
101. Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order (Proceeding Terminated), 84 F.C.C.2d
968, para. 10, 49 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1 (1981).
102. FCC Notices: Elimination of Unnecessary Broadcast Policies, 50 Fed. Reg. 6246,
6248 (1985), 57 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 939 (1985) (footnote omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 6248 n.11 (citation omitted).
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pulled off even today? Changes in the zeitgeist shape both how the public
and the FCC react to stunts involving broadcast hoaxes. Such shifts in
society would make it difficult for broadcasters and observers to predict
audience reactions with a strong degree of certainty.
Despite the rare instances of license revocations for repeated
violations, the primary FCC reaction to hoaxes has been an admonishment.
Admonishments serve as a slap on the wrist to a station. However, they
also put a station on notice that it should refrain from such behavior in the
future, lest it jeopardize their license at the next renewal hearing. Typical
examples of such cases include KSLX-FM in Scottsdale, Arizona, which
had broadcast an April Fool's Day joke that the station had been taken
hostage by Indians.'0 5 The hoax resulted in a number of calls to the police
as well as the 911 operators. However, because the joke was a one-time
incident and the licensee instituted station policies to prevent such hoaxes
in the future, no further action was taken beyond an admonishment.'
Similar considerations prevented the FCC from taking more serious
actions .against WCCM-FM in Hartford, Connecticut, after it falsely
broadcast that a volcano had erupted nearby. Like other such stunts, police
received a large number of calls from the announcement, which also
caused a traffic jam.
The FCC is powerless to levy a fine against a station unless there is a
specific regulation prohibiting the disfavored conduct.L' For many years,
the only tools available to the FCC to discourage hoaxes were either a
letter of admonishment or revocation of the station's license. Such actions
were felt to be either too light of a punishment or too harsh, depending on
the circumstances of the incident under review. In the early 1990s, a
number of well-publicized hoaxes convinced the FCC to attempt a new
direction.
105. Officials at the FCC indicated to the Author that a disproportionate number of such
one-time hoax incidents occur on April Fool's Day.
106. See STEVEN A. LERMAN Er AL., PREVENTING THE BROADCASTING OF HOAXES AND
OTm FALSE OR DEcEPTVE PROGRAMMING: A REVIEW OF LEGAL PRiNCIPLES AND
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES AND PRocEDuREs TO BE I)MPLEMENTED BY BROADCAST LiCENsEEs 5
(1992) (referencing FCC Letter of Admonishment Ref. No. 8310-TD, C6-220 (OcL 2,
1989)). Leventhal, Senter & Lerman prepared this source in a pamphlet for Infinity
Broadcasting following the new FCC regulations concerning broadcast hoaxes passed in
1992. Infinity Broadcasting was the license holder for KROQ-FM in Pasadena, California, a
station that played an important role in inspiring the FCC to craft the 1992 regulations.
107. See id. (citing FCC Letter of Admonishment Ref. No. 8310-TD, C5-820 (July 26,
1990)).
108. See, e.g., Liability of Montachusett Brdcst. Inc., Licensee of Radio Station
WXLO(FM) Fitchburg, Mass. for a Forfeiture, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7
F.C.C.R. 3594, para. 5, 71 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 26 (1992) [hereinafter Forfeiture
Memorandum Opinion and Order].
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V. TuRNING POINT: GENESIS OF THE MODERN REGULATION
During the morning of January 29, 1991, Disc Jockey John Ulett of
station KSHE-FM in Crestwood, Missouri, interrupted the music
programming with a ten-second broadcast tone followed by an announcer's
voice stating, "Ladies and gentlemen, we are experiencing technical
difficulties. Please stand b-." ' 09 The announcement was then cut off by the
sound of an air raid siren which continued underneath the broadcast of a
second voice stating: "Attention, attention. This is an official civil defense
warning. This is not a test. The United States is under nuclear attack.""
0
Various sound effects of screams, explosions, and a repeat of the broadcast
tone were then heard before the original announcer returned to explain that
they expected to resume normal broadcasting shortly. True to his word, the
station's music then returned."'
As previously indicated, broadcast hoaxes are often a product of the
age. In this case, KSHE broadcast the phony nuclear attack two weeks after
the start of the Persian Gulf War. Calls concerning the incident flooded the
station. Two hours after the hoax aired, Ulett returned to the microphone
and admitted that he faked the program and that he merely wanted to make
a statement concerning nuclear war. " The station subsequently aired an
official disclaimer and apology that afternoon and repeated it throughout
the day."' KSHE repeated its regrets in the local news the following day.
Although the stunt did not cause the amount of actual disruptions that
occurred from other station hoaxes in the past, the FCC clearly was not
amused.
The FCC immediately launched an investigation into the KSHE
incident 4 Unlike the fact pattern involving the KKX license revocation,
Ulett created the hoax announcement without the management's
knowledge. In contrast to the weekend long publicity stunt from KIKX, the
hoax lasted for little more than two hours before the station aired
retractions and apologies. In addition, there was no record of any
significant disruptions in law enforcement activities. Upon learning of the
incident, the station's management suspended Ulett for one week without
pay and instituted formal policies to prevent such events in the future.
109. See Letter from Donna R. Searcy, Secretary, FCC, to Emmis Broadcasting Co.,
Licensee, KSHE (FM) (Apr. 24, 1991), 6 F.C.C.R. 2289,2289, 69 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 155
(1991) [hereinafter Letter].
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See id. It is unclear whether Ulett's admission was voluntary or if he was forced to
explain the hoax by the station management.
113. See1d.
114. See id.
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Nonetheless, the FCC felt compelled to act. A letter from the FCC to the
station indicated that "[a]t a time when the United States was at war, and
the public was in a heightened state of alert and anxiety about the
possibility of terrorist violence and other dangers, your January 29, 1991,
broadcast obviously had the potential to create widespread panic."'" s The
KSHBE broadcast is a telling example of the "zeitgeist fluxes" that can
cause the FCC to act in different ways to hoaxes perpetuated in different
contexts. Apparently, the backdrop of the Gulf War compelled the FCC to
act upon hearing a simulated nuclear attack perpetuated on the airwaves.1 6
A notable segment of the FCC's letter referenced the first major hoax
that the regulatory agency confronted by repeating a section of the 1985
deregulation memo almost verbatim:
We emphasize that the [FCC]'s policies regarding a broadcaster's
general obligation to program in the public interest and a broadcaster's
specific obligation to refrain from deliberate distortion or falsification
of programming, remain in force.
In this general connection, we note that a current broadcast of a
program such as "War of the Worlds," [sic] without cautionary
language, would violate [FCC] policies-i.e., both our general
policy requiring licensees to program their stations in the public
interest, and our more specific olicy against deliberate distortion
or falsification of programming.
The FCC did not want to let the station get away with a mere
admonishment. However, the revocation of its license was clearly not in
order either. Instead, the FCC characterized the hoax as a false distress
signal prohibited by section 325(a) of the 1934 Act. To help justify its
115. Letter, 6 F.C.C.R. 2289,2289, 69 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 155 (1991).
116. See id. In an interesting side note to the KSHE incident, one source at the FCC told
this Author in 1998 about a rumor concerning the uproar caused by the station. The rumor
indicated that a close relative of then FCC Commissioner Al Sikes was in Missouri at the
time of the nuclear attack broadcast. The relative allegedly heard the broadcast and called
Commissioner Sikes personally to complain, sparking the FCC's efforts to pass a new
regulation against broadcast hoaxes. When contacted about this story, Commissioner Sikes
admitted that he had a daughter who lived in St. Louis at the time who may have heard the
broadcast, but he did not recall hearing from her at the time. Commissioner Sikes indicated
that he thought he remembered hearing that Robert Pettit, General Counsel of the FCC at the
time, may have received a call from a relative concerning KSHE. Mr. Pettit confirmed that
he in fact received a call concerning KSHE from his sister, who also lived in St. Louis at the
time. However, he did not believe she heard the actual broadcast itself, but rather believed
that she had only heard news accounts of the broadcast in the St. Louis area. Both
Commissioner Sikes and Pettit stressed that the FCC received many calls from various
sources complaining about the KSHBE broadcast, and the fact that relatives of top FCC
officials were in St. Louis at the time of the incident played no part in shaping their actions.
The various St. Louis news accounts of the KSHE incident prior to the FCC's actions seem
to support their contentions.
117. Id. (citations omitted).
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characterization, the FCC pointed to the use of a broadcast tone which
invoked a comparison to the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) signal
which stations air in the midst of emergencies:
To the extent that listeners understood the tone was used to "cry wolf,"
the integrity of the Emergency Broadcast System [EBS] (see 47 C.F.R.§ 73.901 et seq.) has been undermined. Moreover, broadcast of the
tone, even if not a true EBS tone, conflicts with the clear underlying
purpose of the procedures in [s]ections 73.909 and 73.910 of the
[r]ules, which are designed to ensure prior authentication of a true
national emergency before activation of the tone for emergency
cuing.1
18
The FCC's letter to KSHE ended with a footnote stating: "Due to the
serious harm to the public which can be caused by broadcasts that mimic
EBS tones, the [FCC] plans to release a public notice which highlights this
case and the importance of compliance with our EBS Rules."" 9
With a specific broadcast law violation that it could point to, the FCC
fined KSHE twenty-five thousand dollars. Ulett termed the entire incident
as "embarrassing."'1 20 In addition to his week's suspension from the station,
the broadcaster was also fired from his eight-year post as the St. Louis
Cardinals' public-address announcer.2
The same month that FCC issued KSHE its fine for the nuclear attack
hoax, a second incident involving station KROQ-FM in Los Angeles
garnered widespread attention. The genesis of the KROQ hoax developed
in June 1990 when hosts Kevin Ryder and Gene Baxter of the Kevin and
Bean morning show hosted a program entitled Confess Your Crime. Baxter
and Ryan asked callers to phone-in and confess any mild transgressions
that they committed.'2 In the midst of the show, an anonymous caller came
on the air to reluctantly announce that he killed his girlfriend after finding
her sleeping with another man. After the hosts suggested that they put him
in touch with someone who could help, the caller hung up. Calls poured
into the station inquiring if the call was a joke. Baxter and Ryder insisted
that it was not a fabrication.123
The show caught the attention of the L.A. County Sheriff's
Department, which was looking to solve a number of unsolved murders
118. d. at 2290 (footnote omitted).
119. Ida at2290n.l.
120. John M. McGuire, No Fooling!, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATcH EVERYDAY MAGAZINE,
Apr. 1, 1997, at Dl, available at 1997 WL 3332772.
121. See id. Ulett returned to the Post two years later. See id.
122. Various confessions included stealing bowling balls, running over cats, and having
sex with both a gilfriend and her mother. See Steve Weinstein, Deejays Confess to Being
Shaken up by Caller, L.A. TMEs, June 14, 1990, at F10.
123. See id.
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
with similar facts to the caller's confession. The station turned over a tape
of the broadcast to help facilitate the Sheriff's Department with its
investigations. Months worth of inquiries went by before the incident was
exposed in April 1991 as indeed being a hoax. The caller was a fellow
broadcaster Doug Roberts, a friend of Ryder and Baxter.12
The public was outraged upon learning the truth. News stories
profiled the furious parents of murdered daughters who were awaiting the
then hopeful outcomes of their unsolved cases. The L.A. County Sheriff's
Department billed the station for over twelve thousand dollars to cover the
costs of their wasted murder investigations.12 The Infinity Broadcasting
Corp.-license holder for KROQ-suspended Baxter, Ryder, and Roberts
for five days without pay, directed each of them to perform 149 hours of
community service, and forced them to pay the Sheriff's bill out of their
pockets. 26 Once again, the FCC quickly got into the fray.
Program director Jeff Wyatt of KPWR-FM in Los Angeles summed
up the industry's reaction to news of the FCC investigation:
I don't think anybody's scared at all about this until they see how
the FCC reacts. If it amounts to a hand slap, a letter of reprimand, who
cares? If it's a letter of reprimand, [KPWR morning deejay] Jay
Thomas is going to have a murderer on the air live tomorrow. If they
do something drastic like take their license away, that's a message. A
$20,000 fine-that's a message.
127
At the end of its investigation, the FCC chose not to send the kind of
message that Wyatt described, perhaps in part because it felt it did not have
the proper tools to do so. Unlike the KSHE incident, an on-air murder
confession could not be construed as a false distress signal by any credible
means. Although the FCC could always admonish a station or revoke its
license for violations of broad and general policies concerning the public
interest, it was powerless to levy a fine without a violation of a specific
statute or regulation.Irs Here, the only option outside of admonishing the
124. KROQ actually hired Roberts shortly after his fake call, but long before the hoax
was eventually exposed.
125. See Sheriff's Dept. Bills KROQ $12,000 for Hoax, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1991, at F2.
126. See KROQ Receives a Slap on the Wrist for Hoax, L.A. TMfs, Dec. 4, 1991, at F7.
127. Claudia Paig, Will KROQ Get away with "Murder"?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1991, at
Fl.
128. See Forfeiture Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 3594, para. 5,71 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 26 (1992). The Montachusett Broadcasting incident concerned a five-
thousand-dollar fine levied against WXLO-FM for violating section 73.1206, which
prohibits the broadcasting of telephone conversations without permission of all parties to the
conversation, unless they should otherwise be aware that they are on-the-air. In its defense,
WXLO contended that the fine was unduly harsh in light of the fact that the FCC merely
admonished KROQ for perpetuating a hoax that was to be considered a far more serious
offense than the behavior with which they were accused. In response to this argument, Roy
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station was to revoke its license. Despite past cases such as KIKX, the FCC
was still reluctant to institute its harshest penalty against an isolated
incident. Thus in the end, the FCC gave KROQ a letter of admonishment.'29
In explaining its decision, the FCC pointed to the following facts:
Station KROQ-FM's broadcast of the hoax murder confession was a
spontaneous, isolated event, orchestrated solely by certain on-air
personnel, who subsequently engaged in a coverup. Neither station
management nor the licensee knew, or had any reason to suspect, that
the broadcast was actually a hoax. Further, upon learning that the
broadcast was a hoax management promptly effectuated disciplinary
and remedial action.
Despite the admonishment, the FCC and segments of the public were left
with a sense of frustration following the KROQ incident. The concern was
exacerbated by an incident in July of 1991 involving station WALE-AM in
Providence, Rhode Island. After a prompting from talk show host Steve
White, the station's news director, Thomas Moriarty, announced over the
air that White had been "shot in the head" while outside the station on a
break.13' The station announced that the report had been a hoax a mere ten
minutes after Moriarty finished his "news story."'32 In the meantime
however, several police cruisers along with a lieutenant and a sergeant
iashed to the scene where they were met by several mermbers of the media
who were trying to obtain information about the shooting. 33 Station
management was not involved in the planning of the deception.' 34 The
station issued apologies throughout the day, offered to reimburse the police
for all costs and promptly fired all those involved in the incident. Just as it
J. Stewart, Chief of the FCC's Mass Media Bureau wrote,
The two cases cannot be compared. Simply, the subject case involves a violation
of a [FCC] rule whereas the KROQ-FM case does not. In the KROQ-FM matter,
only a violation of a [FCC] policy, for which no forfeiture may be imposed, was
involved. In a case where a hoax broadcast occurred and the [FCC] was able to
establish that a violation of the Communications Act was also involved, a $25,000
forfeiture was assessed.
Id at para. 5 (citing Letter Apr. 24, 1991, 6 F.C.C.R. 2289, 69 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
155 (1991)) (emphasis added).
129. See Letter from Donna R. Searcy, Secretary, FCC, to Lyle Reeb, General Manager,
Radio Station KROQ-FM (Dec. 4, 1991) 6 F.C.C.R. 7262,7262.
130. Id. (footnote omitted).
131. See Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complainants and Investigations Branch
Enforcement Division Mass Media Bureau, to Frank Battaglia, President, North American
Broadcasting Co., Inc. Licensee, Radio Station WALE-AM (Mar. 24, 1992) 7 F.C.C.R.
2345, 2345 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1329.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
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had with KROQ, the FCC admonished WALE.135
By November 1991, the FCC was ready for action. It drafted a notice
of a proposed rule which read as follows:
No licensee of any broadcast station shall broadcast information or
other material it knows to be false if its foreseeable that broadcast of
the information could cause substantial public harm, and if broadcast
of the information does in fact directly cause substantial public harm.
Note I:
For purposes of this rule, "public harm" is immediate, substantial
and actual damage to the health and safety of the general public or to
property, or substantial diversion of law enforcement or other public
safety authorities from their duties.
Note 2:
The public harm will be deemed foreseeable if the licensee could
expect with a significant degree of certainty that public harm would
occur. Foreseeability will not be inferred from warnings or disclaimers
associated with the broadcast. Lack of foreseeability may be
determined in light of factors such as the content of the broadcast or• . . 136
the timing of the broadcast (e.g., April Fool's Day or Halloween).
The proposed rule had three requirements that would trigger sanctions: (1)
the licensee must have known that the broadcast material was false; (2) the
hoax must have directly caused immediate, substantial, and actual public
harm; and (3) the public harm must have been foreseeable.
Before making a final decision on the proposed regulation, the FCC
sought comments from broadcasters and the public on any aspect of the
rule. However, the FCC asked for explicit advice in the following areas: (1)
whether elements of the rule were adequate to prevent dramatizations from
unnecessary scrutiny; (2) whether the phrases "public harm," "immediate,"
and "substantial" should be construed broadly or narrowly; (3) whether
determining the existence of substantial public harm should be based on
how widespread the harm is or on how severe it is, regardless of how many
are affected; (4) whether actual harm or the mere threat of harm should be
required in order to trigger sanctions; (5) whether laws of various
jurisdictions make such a rule unnecessary; and (6) what factors should
help determine whether or not public harm is foreseeable.' 37 Additionally,
the FCC asked for more general comments regarding First Amendment
concerns, including whether or not the rule might be vague, overbroad, or
restrictive.38
135. See i.
136. Amendment of Part 73 of the FCC's Rules Regarding BrdcsL Hoaxes, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 6 F.C.C.R. 6935, para. 7 (Nov. 14, 1991).
137. See id. at paras. 2-6.
138. Seeid. atparas. 1-6.
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Along with the notice of the proposed rule, Commissioner James H.
Quello, the same commissioner who dissented from the IIKX license
revocation in 1980, offered a separate statement, which begins as follows:
I welcome this proceeding given the number of high-profile
broadcast hoaxes during the past year. Generally, I do not see how the
public interest is served by a broadcast that does nothing more than
scare or alarm the audience for the mere thrill of it. We should be able
to draft a rule to deal with such situations.
At the same time, I recognize that direct regulation of broadcast
content is inherently sensitive. It may be difficult to craft a rule that
can encompass real abuses without stifling creative programming. We
therefore must take care that any rule on hoaxes not prevent the
broadcast of programs such as Orson Wells'[s] [sic] "War of the
Worlds " [sic] which is widely recognized as a classic of American
radio.1 
9
In the context of the rule proposal, as well as the FCC's actions from
the previous fifty-plus years, the importance of Commissioner Quello's
statement should not be underestimated. The FCC previously stated on
more than one occasion that the War of the Worlds conflicted with the
generalized policy of promoting broadcasting within the public interest.
Now that the FCC was about to consider a concrete regulation involving
hoaxes, a prominent Commissioner had gone on record to state that War of
the Worlds was nothing short of an American classic that needed to be
protected in a free broadcasting environment.4
139. Id at 6937 (emphasis added).
140. See id. During his 23-plus years as an FCC Commissioner, James Quello became
one of the FCC's most consistent and stalwart critics when it came to regulations concerning
broadcasting content. This was perhaps due in part to the fact that Commissioner Quello was
one of the few agency commissioners to have had an extensive career in broadcasting before
being appointed to the FCC in 1974. Prior to his appointment as Commissioner, Quello
spent 29 years in virtually every aspect of radio broadcasting. His career began in 1945,
starting in the promotions department of WXYZ in Detroit. Two years later, he moved to the
cross-town rival WJR. In 1964, Capitol Cities Broadcasting bought out WJR and made
Quello General Manager of the station, as well as Vice President of the parent corporation.
Quello was inducted into the Radio Hall of Fame in 1996. Upon receiving this honor,
the ceremony's presenter of awards, Edward F. McLaughlin stated: "Because he was so
thoroughly regulated as a broadcaster, James Quello has become a more empathic regulator
as an FCC Commissioner. His was perhaps the perfect appointment. .. as America moved
into the age of deregulation-a phenomenon of which he has been an outspoken champion."
Rich Samuels, 1996 Radio Hall of Fame (visited Oct. 3, 1999)
<http://www.mcs.netl-richsamlnbcmmlrhof/rhof96se.html>.
In later years, Quello even questioned the FCC's power to revoke broadcast licenses.
"It is such a drastic step," he stated. "No one should have the power to bankrupt a company.
I voted to revoke 81 licenses. I regretted it." Telephone Interview with James H. Quello,
Former FCC Commissioner (Sept. 3, 1998). He suggested one possible alternative to
revocations would be to force an offending licensee to sell its license to a minority owner at
a sizable discount. See id.
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The dichotomy underscores the struggle that the FCC faced in dealing
with the problem from the start. The differing factual context for each case
involving broadcast hoaxes helped to make the FCC's actions appear
somewhat erratic at times. However, Commissioner Quello's admission
indicates that, much like 1938, there was still a struggle within the FCC
itself regarding attempts at developing a more broad-based philosophy to
deal with the hoax question.141 Commissioner Quelo echoed the cautious
approach espoused by fellow former Commissioners Anne P. Jones,
Abbott Washburn, and T.A.M. Craven. Others thought that the dangers
presented by the hoax problem were too great to continue a tepid
enforcement policy and felt that measures more far reaching in scope were
necessary.
The FCC seemed well aware of the tightrope it walked in crafting a
new rule. From the outset of the dialogue, it was clear that the FCC did not
wish to overreach with its proposal. Attempting to allay the immediate
fears of many broadcasters, the FCC stated:
It is not our intent to address harmless pranks, or to deter broadcasts
that might upset some listeners but do not pose a substantial threat to
public health and safety. We have specifically rejected a regulatory
approach that could be characterized as an "overreaction' For
example, we do not intend to reach incidents such as the April Fool's
joke perpetrated recently by a station, which announced that one of the
stars of the city's National Football League team had been traded.
While this prank undoubtedly distressed some football fans, it is our
intent to focus on a narrow Category of cases that present the potential
for substantial public harm.
142
Five organizations responded to the invitation to comment on the
proposed hoax regulation: CBS, NBC, National Public Radio, the National
Association of Broadcasters, and the law firm of Haley, Bader & Potts.'43
Each organization questioned the need for such a rule. If the FCC passed
such a regulation despite their concerns, many of the groups asked that it
be tailored as narrowly as possible in order to avoid First Amendment
concerns and chilling effects on the broadcasters' programming.
A passage from the Haley, Bader & Potts commentary best illustrates
141. In 1998, when asked to recount the debate concerning broadcast hoaxes, neither
former Commissioner Quello nor former FCC Chairman Sikes could recall any specific
details outside of the written record. Quello pointed out that the federal open meetings law
(the so-called "Sunshine Act" passed in 1976) prevented the commissioners from discussing
the subjects of rule making with each other outside of an open public meeting. See
Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994).
142. Amendment of Part 73 of the Comm'n's Rules Regarding Broadcast Hoaxes, Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, 6 F.C.C.R. 6935, para. 2 (1991) (citations omitted).
143. Haley, Bader & Potts is a Washington, D.C. based finn established in 1939, which
specializes in communications law and represents various broadcasting entities.
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the collective concerns found in the responses:
Although we believe the public interest compels [FCC] regulatory
oversight of broadcast hoaxes, we question the need for a rule, for four
reasons. First, the isolated incidents to which the NPRM [Notice of
Proposed Rule Making] refers do not appear to require industry-wide
regulation by rule. Second, as the NPRM points out, the elements of a
rule would necessarily involve the [FCC] in program content
judgements, which would impinge upon First Amendment
considerations. Third, adoption of the rule in the name of regulatory
flexibility, to enable the [FCC] to impose a monetary forfeiture, is an
expediency which is outweighed both by the infrequent incidences of
hoaxes and by First Amendment considerations. Fourth, the kind of
hoax which causes the results upon which the NPRM focuses-
damage to public safety and health, diversion of law enforcement
resources, and damage to property-is sufficiently serious an abuse of
the public interest to call into question the licensee's basic
qualifications, whether at renewal time, upon a sale of the station, or in
a revocation proceeding. Contemporaneous enforcement, however, is
better left to sanction under local law, where actual damages are
available to rectify actual harm.14
Other concerns centered on the problems inherent in the vague language
used in the proposal. It was argued that broadcasters would have a difficult
time determining just what kind of program would cause harm that was
truly 'Toreseeable."' 4 5 Additional criticism was leveled at the vagueness of
the phrase "substantial public harm" which, it was argued, would allow
unfettered subjective judgments by the FCC rather than objective
standards.4 6 NBC emphasized the free market consequences of losing
public credibility and audience share if a station engaged in damaging
hoaxes thus arguing against the need for additional regulations.'4 7
The FCC ultimately rejected the arguments that an additional
regulation was unnecessary, though it was mindful of the concerns raised
by the First Amendment. Therefore, the FCC adopted a more narrowly
tailored rule on May 14, 1992, which remains the current regulation today.
144. Comments of Haley, Bader & Potts, Amendment of Part 73 of the Comm'n's Rules
Regarding Brdest. Hoaxes at 2, MM Docket No. 91-314 (Jan. 2, 1992). John Wells King
drafted the comments on behalf of Haley, Bader & Potts.
145. See id. at 6-7.
146. See Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters at 3, Amendment of
Part 73 of the Comm'n's Rules Regarding Brdcst. Hoaxes, MM Docket No. 91-314 (Jan. 2,
1992). Henry L. Baumann & Steven A. Bookshester drafted the comments on behalf of the
National Association of Broadcasters.
147. See Reply Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at 3-4, Amendment of
Part 73 of the Comm'n's Rules Regarding Brdcst. Hoaxes, MM Docket No. 91-314 (Feb. 3,
1992). Howard Monderer & Jane E. Genster drafted the reply comments on behalf of the
National Broadcasting. Co.
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Section 73.1217 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations now reads:
No licensee or permittee of any broadcast station shall broadcast false
information concerning a crime or catastrophe if:
(a) The licensee knows this information is false;
(b) It is foreseeable that the broadcast of the information will cause
substantial public harm, and
(c) Broadcast of the information does in fact cause substantial public
harm.
Any programming accompanied by a disclaimer will be presumed not
to pose foreseeable harm if the disclaimer clearly characterizes the
program as a fiction and is presented in a way that is reasonable under
the circumstances.
Note: For purposes of this rule, "public harm" must begin
immediately, and cause direct and actual damage to property or to the
health or safety of the general public, or diversion of law enforcement
or other public health and safety authorities from their duties. The
public harm will be deemed foreseeable if the licensee could expect
with a significant degree of certainty that public harm would occur. A
"crime" is any act or omission that makes the offender subject to
criminal punishment by law. A "catastrophe" is a disaster or imminent
disaster involving [a] violent or sudden event affecting the public.' 48
Section 503(b) of the 1934 Act as amended allows the FCC to issue fines
for any willful or repeated violation of a regulation by a broadcast station
licensee.149 Armed with the new 1992 regulation, it seemed as though the
FCC was prepared to launch a new era in the containment of broadcast
hoaxes.
Or was it? To date, FCC enforcement officials have confirmed that
not a single broadcaster has ever been cited under 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217, nor
has there been any license revocations stemming from hoaxes since the
148. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (1998).
149. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (Supp. II 1996). The statutory language of section
503(b)(2)(A) of the Act specifies that the amount of such fine can be up to $25,000 for each
violation or each day of a continuing violation, provided that the total fine does not exceed
$250,000 for each act. However, the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 required all
federal agencies to adjust their civil penalty amounts every four years in order to account for
inflation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(d) (Supp. I1 1997). The FCC thereby allowed for a fine of
up to $27,500 for each violation with a cap of $275,000 in forfeitures stemming from each
act. See Amendment of Section 1.80 of the Comm'n's Rules (visited Oct. 2, 1999)
<http:llwww.fcc.govlBureauslMiscellaneouslOrdersl1997/fcc97002.txt>. The base fine for a
violation of the hoax rule is seven thousand dollars, which is then adjusted after the
consideration of several factors involving the severity of the violation. For a review of FCC
policy regarding assessments of forfeiture amounts, see Commissioners Forfeiture Policy
Statement and Amendment of Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate the Forfeiture
Guidelines, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 17,087, para. 2 n.3, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1314
(1997); Policy Statement on Standards for Assessing Forfeitures, Policy Statement, 6
F.C.C.R. 4695, para. 5, 69 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 823 (1991).
[Vol. 52
THE FCC AND RADIO HOAXES
regulation's passage. This statistic could be interpreted as anecdotal
evidence that the number of serious station hoaxes has abated in recent
years, perhaps attesting to the regulation's effectiveness as a deterrent. It
could also indicate, however, that the FCC continues to be wary of
program content regulations and construes any rules concerning them in a
rather narrow fashion.
Whether the new rule represented a harsher stance by the FCC in their
regulation of broadcast hoaxes is ultimately a matter of perspective. Had
the FCC been able to give KROQ a hefty fine for its murder confession
hoax, the station would certainly have considered that to be a tougher
penalty than the admonishment it received.I-° However, stations such as
KX and WMJX certainly would have welcomed such a fine if it would
have served as an alternative to a revocation of their respective licenses.s'
Ultimately, section 73.1217 merely represented an additional option for the
FCC to employ in their increasing frustration with the hoax problem.
VI. ANALYSIS OF 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217
Given the absence of any case law dealing with the relatively new
broadcast hoax rule, it is impossible to predict for certain how it might be
applied to factual contexts. However, when one considers the FCC
comments, past actions, and recent hoax incidents that have not resulted in
forfeitures under section 73.1217, certain broad observations can be drawn.
The current regulation contains four prongs: (1) the false information
must concern a crime or catastrophe; (2) the licensee must know the
information is false; (3) it must be foreseeable that broadcasting the false
information will cause substantial public harm; and (4) broadcasting the
false information must cause substantial public harm in fact.152 All four
prongs must be satisfied before a violation of the regulation can be said to
have occurred. 53
The first prong limits the scope of the rule to hoaxes concerning
"crimes" or "catastrophes." This is substantially narrower than the scope of
the rule originally proposed, which encompassed all subject matters
concerning false material and information. In explaining the change, the
FCC reiterated the fact that "it is not our intent to restrict harmless pranks,
150. See Letter from Donna R. Searcy, Secretary, FCC, to Lyle Reeb, General Manager,
Radio Station KROQ-FM (Dec. 4, 1991) 6 F.C.C.R. 7262,7262.
151. See Petition for Reconsideration of Denial of License, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 440,48 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1006 (1980); WMJX, Inc. for Renewal of
License, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 251,48 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1139
(1981).
152. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (1998).
153. See id.
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
or to deter broadcasts that might upset some listeners but do not pose a
substantial threat to public safety. The crimes and catastrophes prong
limited the rule's scope so as to soothe the concerns of broadcasters that
the regulation would scrutinize any dramatized work but would also allow
for a direct response to cases such as KSHE and KROQ. As stated in the
note to the regulation, a "crime!' is defined as "any act or omission that
makes the offender subject to criminal punishment by law."'55 Thus,
potentially, applications of the hoax rule could tm on the variations of
state law jurisdictions with separate criminal statute provisions, though
murder confessions, such as the KROQ example, would presumably apply
uniformly.
The linking of the word "crime" with "catastrophe" within the first
prong seems to imply that the FCC directed the regulation at violent or
serious crimes. If one were to use the broader interpretation suggesting a
hoax ban on any crimes, then the state jurisdictional difference would
become significant. For instance, one would be able to devise a hoax
revolving around legal prostitution in Nevada and not fall under the
regulation, while the same hoax in other states would satisfy the criteria of
the regulation's first prong. Though, presumably, the less serious a hoax
crime, the less likely it would be to portend or cause "substantial public
harm" as required by prongs (3) and (4).
A "catastrophe" is defined as "a disaster or imminent disaster
involving [a] violent or sudden event affecting the public."'156 No doubt the
FCC formed this definition with the KSHE nuclear attack in mind. It is less
clear, however, how broad the definition could be interpreted. A Martian
attack could certainly be characterized as a catastrophe by Earthlings who
do not care to share the Earth with our alien brethren. Likely, the phrase
would be used for descriptions of events that are widespread, such as brush
fires, floods, biological disasters, earthquakes, hurricanes, and so forth.
Not all events causing mass disruptions can be considered a
catastrophe under the regulation's definition. For instance, consider a hoax
which involved a supposed landing of the Discovery space shuttle. On
April Fools' Day 1993, KGB-FM in San Diego told its listeners that the
shuttle was being diverted from Edwards Air Force Base to Montgomery
Field, a small airport in the middle of a crowded residential and
commercial district of the city. Although no shuttle flight was in progress
that day, over one thousand people arrived at the airport at the alleged
154. Amendment of Part 73 Regarding Brdcst. Hoaxes, Report and Order (Proceeding
Terminated), 7 F.C.C.R. 4106, para. 9,70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1383 (1992).
155. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 note (1998).
156. See id.
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landing time, tying up its traffic for hours and diverting police units.'5
Although the viewing of a space shuttle landing could cause a large
segment of a city to divert its attentions, it could not be considered a
"disaster" by any reasonable definition of the term. Since the hoax did not
concern a crime or catastrophe, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 could not apply.!
The KGB incident illustrates the limitations of the regulation. The
"crime or catastrophe" prong serves to limit its application even though the
actual amount of public harm caused by a phantom shuttle landing may be
greater than the amount of actual harm caused by a bogus kidnapping.
However, note that 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 is a tool to be used in addition to
the FCC's broader powers to regulate what is in the public interest. The
rule does not replace the FCC's inherent power to revoke licenses or
admonish stations. Instead, it compliments its already existing powers.
Thus stations should not hope to plan harmful hoaxes that fall outside of
the specific regulation and believe that they could escape the FCC's
scrutiny.
Another typical example illustrating how the regulation is limited in
its application involved sports-talk station XTRA in San Diego where two
hosts claimed to be interviewing ABC's Dan Dierdorf. In fact, the
interviewee was an impersonator acting as though he was intoxicated. 59
While the real Dierdorf contemplated pursuing individual legal action
against the station, this remained another scenario in which 47 C.F.R. §
73.1217 would not apply since no crime or catastrophe was involved.'O
The second prong of the regulation states that the licensee must know
that the information concerning the crime or catastrophe is false. Although
the rule specifically refers to the licensee, FCC regulations have rarely
157. See Michael Granberry, April Fools' Hoax No Joke in San Diego, Los ANGELES
Tams, Apr. 2, 1993, at A26.
158. Norman Goldstein, the FCC's Enforcement Chief of Mass Media Complaints,
indicated that he would not pursue a case such as this-not even to include a letter of
censure to the station. He stated simply: "The FCC does not regulate content." Interview
with Norman Goldstein, FCC Chief of Complaints & Political Programming Branch,
Enforcement Div., Mass Media Bureau, in Washington D.C. (Mar. 12, 1998). However, a
police spokesman for San Diego claimed that KGB would be billed for the police manpower
hours needed to clear the traffic jam, and that the City Attorney would become involved if it
refused to pay. See Granberry, supra note 157, at A26. Stations would be wise to remember
that federal officials are not all that they have to worry about when assessing the
consequences of their programming.
159. Larry Stewart, Dierdorflnterview Fake, Anger Real, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Nov. 13,
1996, at C4.
160. This assumes that no California statute involving public drunkenness would apply
under a broad interpretation of the regulation's first prong. If such a statute were to apply,
the other remaining prongs of the regulation would still need to be satisfied-an unlikely
event in this particular scenario.
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limited the phrase to the actual holder of the license. The term "licensee"
can also refer to various employees of the station, as well as corporate
officials if the license holder is a corporate entity. In a variety of situations,
a licensee will be held responsible for the actions of its employees under a
respondeat superior theory. To have otherwise would not provide any
incentive for a license holder to supervise his staff. Stations could then
easily subvert any policy and regulatory requirements by merely shielding
the license holder from having any direct, hands-on operations at the
broadcast facility.
License holders argued that when one takes prompt corrective action
subsequent to a violation, such actions should be considered by the FCC in
assessing liability. To this theory, the FCC responded:
Although our general policy is not to consider such remedial actions in
determining whether a rule violation has in fact occurred, we do note
that a licensee's overall conduct in connection with such a violation is
always assessed in determining the appropriate sanction and could, in
certain circumstances, result in a decision that no sanction is
warranted. 62
The KROQ incident provides an example of this principle in action.
Neither the licensee nor management had knowledge of the murder
confession hoax when perpetrated by the on-air staff. As soon as KROQ
discovered the hoax, it swiftly punished those involved and instituted
official station policies to prevent such a reoccurrence.
There are no hard and fast rules to determine mitigating factors when
liability is imputed to a licensee. However, a comparison between the
KROQ and KIKX incidents provides a relatively clear example of the
distinctions to be made. Recall that for the KKX "kidnapping," the
station's general manager helped to create the stunt and neglected to
supervise its execution until the hoax had already spun out of control.
Many on the station's staff knew of the plan well before the broadcast. In
contrast, KROQ's management was left completely in the dark. Only the
on-air talent planned and executed the phony confession. Once the hoax
was discovered, management acted immediately to stem the damage.
Another question that remains unanswered from the second prong
concerns what kind of knowledge is required. Certainly actual knowledge
161. See, e.g., Application of WMJX-FM, Miami, Fla. for Renewal of License, Decision,
85 F.C.C.2d 251, para. 39, 48 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1339 (1981); Arizona License Decision,
78 F.C.C.2d 857, para. 24,47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1233 (1980); Liability of Empire Brdcst.
Corp., License of Radio Station KFLN, Baker, Mont. for Forfeiture, Memorandum and
Opinion Order, 25 F.C.C.2d 68, 19 Rad. Reg.2d 1191 (1970).
162. Amendment of Part 73 Regarding Brdcst. Hoaxes, Report and Order (Proceeding
Terminated), 7 F.C.C.R. 4106, para. 12, 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1385 (1992) (footnote
omitted).
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on the part of the licensee or his employees will satisfy the second prong.
What is left unclear, however, is if there are any situations where implied
knowledge may be imputed to the broadcasters. The only certainty is that
there is no strict liability involved. Use of a strict liability threshold would
effectively end the talk radio format since callers are able to turn the tables
on the broadcasters and perform hoaxes of their own. One such example
involved a call by a couple to KLOS-FM in Los Angeles who proceeded to
get into an on-air fight and request a divorce after the man accused his
"wife" of cheating on him with his friend. The call turned out to be placed
by an Air Force sergeant and two work cohorts who assumed the roles of
his wife and friend, resulting in a public embarrassment to the station.6
Given the nature of call-in shows, the required level of knowledge would
need to be at least substantially implied, if not actual, in order to trigger
liability under the hoax rule. Otherwise, interactive radio formats would be
chilled considerably.
The third prong requires that it be foreseeable that the hoax broadcast
will produce substantial public harm.16 This remains perhaps the most
vague and controversial of the prongs. Many questions and considerations
are raised in determining "foreseeability."
First, what is the effect of program disclaimers in the foreseeability
test? This question is alluded to in the body of the regulation itself. It
states: "Any programming accompanied by a disclaimer will be presumed
not to pose foreseeable harm if the disclaimer clearly characterizes the
program as a fiction and is presented in a way that is reasonable under the
circumstances."'6 This seems to indicate that if a hoax broadcast contains a
disclaimer as to its dramatic nature, at the very least, the burden of proof
will shift from the broadcaster to the FCC to prove that the harm was in
fact foreseeable. As the note to the regulation states, the amount of
foreseeability must comport itself with a "significant degree of
certainty."' It is by no means clear, however, that such a disclaimer would
constitute an absolute defense. It is equally unclear what quantity and type
of disclaimers would be "reasonable under the circumstances."' 1
6
Recall that War of the Worlds had four such disclaimers, yet they did
not prevent the widespread panic. The reason behind this problem is that
radio audiences do not necessarily tune in to a program at its start. Unlike
163. See Claudia Puig, "Mark and Brian" Get Burned by a Hoax Call, Los ANGEaas
TiMES, Dec. 18, 1989, at Fl.
164. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (1998).
165. See U
166. Id. at note (emphasis added).
167. Id.
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the audiences for other media-such as movies-radio listeners are
continually tuning in and out of a program's content throughout all points
in its transmission. As a result, commuters who turn on their car radio
twenty minutes past the hour do not immediately have a context for what
they are listening to. Thus any disclaimer aired within the first third of a
one-hour program will be completely ineffective to such listeners.
The FCC offered some of its own guidelines of reasonableness which
stated that:
[Ilndicia of reasonableness would include airing disclaimers at the
beginning and end of a program and ensuring that no more than
[fifteen] minutes elapses between disclaimers during a program. We do
not intend to impose a requirement that all fictional works must now
include disclaimers. Rather, disclaimers would be necessary onl& in
those programs that would otherwise meet all elements of the rule.
It is unclear if disclaimers timed more than fifteen minutes apart
would be less reasonable, or if the FCC intended to fix fifteen minutes as a
specific benchmark. Many radio programs are short skits and do not adhere
to a complete one-hour time clock schedule. Fifteen minute intervals would
clearly be ineffective and inappropriate under many circumstances, such as
the one time nuclear alert from KSHE or an intermittent announcement of a
false space shuttle landing.
The FCC has pointed to other factors that will be considered in
determining foreseeability. Such factors include the timing of the broadcast
(e.g., April Fools' Day, when the audience might be on reasonable notice
to expect a hoax) and the "number of public complaints received about the
broadcast."'' 69 This last factor is perplexing in that it suggests that
foreseeability can be determined in hindsight, which contradicts the
meaning and purpose of the term. This also implies that a station will not
be held responsible for the few odd listeners who have particularly low
thresholds of gullibility. All such circumstances are not determinative but
are merely considerations used in the foreseeability prong.
The single greatest determinant in assessing foreseeability is the
nature of the broadcast itself. The more inherently believable and realistic a
program is, the greater the likelihood that foreseeable harm will be
imputed 70 Unfortunately, this analysis is still susceptible to problems.
What is inherently believable to one audience may strike another as an
example of naive gullibility. Radio listeners today might chuckle at the
168. Broadcast Services; Brdcst. Hoaxes, 57 Fed. Reg. 28,638, 28,640 (1992) (codified
at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
169. Amendment of Part 73 Regarding Brdcst. Hoaxes, Report and Order (Proceeding
Terminated), 7 F.C.C.R. 4106, para. 14,70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1383 (1992).
170. See id.
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notion that anyone could believe a Martian invasion occurring. Yet for
many in 1938, the fear was all too real. Even the updated 1974 Martian
landings portrayed WPRO proved that some could still be fooled in limited
circumstances.
The FCC itself suggested that a broadcast concerning an invasion of
amoebas did not warrant a disclaimer since it was inherently unbelievable.
However, what if such a broadcast came during the outbreak of a war
involving biological weapons? Would people still react to the broadcast in
the same context? As the KSHE incident during the Gulf War showed,
people's sensitivities change with the events that surround them. The
"zeitgeist factor" remains unresolved. The only guidance the FCC provides
is to point out that "[w]e will presume, and will accord broadcasters the
right to presume, that the public will behave in a rational manner. We will
not hold broadcasters accountable for unreasonable or unpredictable public
conduct.'
7
'
The final prong of the regulation holds that the hoax must in fact
cause substantial public harm. Once again, some raise concern regarding
the precise meaning of "substantial public harm." The note to the
regulation provides the primary guidance by holding that "'public harm'
must begin immediately, and cause direct and actual damage to property or
to the health or safety of the general public, or diversion of law
enforcement or other public health and safety authorities from their
duties."' 72 The "diversion of law enforcement" provision is an obvious
response to previous cases such as KJKX and KROQ. Notably though, the
requirement that the public harm begin immediately suggests that a fact
pattern similar to the KROQ hoax might escape the rule. The diversion of
sheriff's deputies during the KROQ incident was not immediate but rather
a gradual escalated action spread out over several months. 73
171. Amendment of Part 73 Regarding Brdcst. Hoaxes, Report and Order (Proceeding
Terminated), 7 F.C.C.R. 4106, para. 13, 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1383 (1992). More than
one managing veteran of a radio station may have cause to question the presumption that the
public will behave in a rational manner. Recall Orson Welles's observation concerning his
War of the Worlds broadcast: "We began to realize, as we plowed on with the destruction of
New Jersey, that the extent of our American lunatic fringe had been underestimated."
WELLEs & BOGDANOVICH, supra note 26, at 18-19.
172. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 note (1998).
173. See Claudia Puig, KROQ Deejays Faked Murder Confession-Sheriff's Dept., Los
ANGELE TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at Fl. A surprising admission came to this Author by the
FCC's Enforcement Chief of Mass Media Complaints, Norman Goldstein, who claimed that
it was unclear if the KROQ hoax would result in violation of the regulation, despite the fact
that the FCC specifically cited KROQ in justifying its new rule. See Amendment of Part 73
Regarding Brdcst. Hoaxes, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 4106, para. 17, 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P
& F) 1383 (1992); Goldstein, supra note 158.
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The FCC also noted that a hoax resulting in no more than a few
complaints to the police will not satisfy the prong, even if the police are
annoyed by having to take the calls. 74 It seems that the level of disruption
must significantly hinder law enforcement from otherwise carrying out its
duties. Nominal or de minimus harms will not suffice.
Also left unresolved by the "substantial public harm in face' prong is
whether or not substantial public harm refers to the intensity of the harm or
the widespread nature of the harm. Would a hoax that directly results in
the death of one person be judged differently than a hoax which causes one
thousand people to run out into the rain and catch colds? No specific
guidance is given for this question, although both factors are likely to be
considered.
The only specific indication is provided in the note to the regulation,
which states that public harm must cause "actual damage to property or to
the health or safety of the general public."'175 Bruised egos and
embarrassment on the part of listeners obviously does not count. Beyond
that, the FCC only declared that "[r]ather than adopt a particular
benchmark or definition by which we will assess 'substantial' public harm,
we have decided to leave this determination to the factual context of each
case."' 76 This style of determination could be described as an appropriate
summary of the FCC's response to the hoax controversy as a whole.
VII. BALANCING PRIORITIES: CONTENT CONTROL IN LIGHT OF
COMPETING CONSIDERATIONS
The reluctance to increase the enforcement against broadcast hoaxes
in recent years most likely stems from two factors: the fear of treading on
broadcasters' First Amendment rights and the potency of the argument that
other laws already exist to deal with such problems. Each time the FCC
issues regulations regarding programming content, it must balance its
mandate to require that stations serve the public interest, along with
competing concerns of censorship, as found in the First Amendment and
section 326 of the 1934 Act, which in fact prevents the FCC from having
the power to censor radio broadcasts. ' 7'
174. See Amendment of Part 73 Regarding Brdest. Hoaxes, Report and Order, 7
F.C.C.R. 4106, para. 17,70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1383.
175. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 note (1998).
176. Amendment of Part 73 Regarding Brdcst. Hoaxes, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R.
4106, para. 17,70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1383.
177. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1998). The FCC's mandate to ensure that stations serve the
public interest can be found in sections 303 and 307 of the Act, among others. For a broad
based overview on how the FCC approaches the censorship/public interest tension, see
Report and Statement of Policy Res: Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C.
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The FCC can justifiably rely on the fact that the Supreme Court has
never struck down a regulation prohibiting speech that threatens to cause
"imminent lawless action."'78 The current approach by the Court was
developed in Brandenburg v. hio'7-9 when it stated:
[Tihe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a [s]tate to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.O
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas further elaborated on the
distinction between protected and unprotected speech:
The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and
what may be made impermissible and subject to regulation is the line
between ideas and overt acts.
The example usually given by those who would punish speech is
the case of one who falsely shouts fire in a crowded theater.
This is, however, a classic case where speech is brigaded with
action. They are indeed inseparable and a prosecution can be launched
for the overt acts actually caused.'
8
'
Even apart from the Brandenburg standards of censorship, which are
most often strictly construed, the Court has also afforded less free speech
protections for the broadcast media as compared to other forms of speech.
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,2 Justice White made the following
observation in upholding the FCC's regulations relating to political
editorials:
Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First
Amendment interest, differences in the characteristics of new media
justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them
Just as the [govemment may limit the use of sound-amplifying
equipment potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized speech, so
may the [g]overnment limit the use of broadcast equipment.
2303 (1960).
178. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (false or deceptive advertising); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamation); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(obscene materials); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words);
United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that televised threats of
political assassination punishable did not violate First Amendment); United States v. Irving,
509 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that false threat of hijacking punishable did not
violate First Amendment).
179. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
180. Id. at447.
181. Id. at 456-57 (Douglas, 3., concurring) (citations omitted).
182. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
183. Ia at 386-87 (footnote and citations omitted).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Even though tangible restrictions exist through the Brandenburg and
Red Lion doctrines, any such regulation "must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same purpose."' 84 Otherwise, it will be
struck down as being overly broad when faced with the subjection of strict
scrutiny by the Court. Compared to the number of documented broadcast
hoaxes, it is rare to find the FCC imposing harsh penalties for them. When
it has however, no station ever successfully raised a First Amendment
defense. Justice Holmes' famous dicta that "[t]he most stringent protection
of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic"' 81 still holds true today.
It is also true that a variety of laws apart from regulation section
73.1217 remain in force to deal with broadcast hoaxes. Even if a hoax did
not meet the criteria specified in the four prongs of section 73.1217, the
specific nature of the hoax may render it vulnerable to other laws and
regulations such as section 325(a) of the 1934 Act, as amended,
(prohibiting false distress signals), section 73.909 (prohibiting the
broadcast of the Emergency Broadcast System tone in absence of an actual
emergency or official test), or broader criminal statutes covering public
endangerment.
As previously indicated, the number of state civil and common laws
that still exist to allow an individual a private right of action against a
station that broadcasts a hoax are too numerous to list. A nonexclusive list
includes libel, rights of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and so forth. The context of each hoax needs to be determined to assess
which causes of civil action might apply. Such laws remain as effective
checks on a broadcast licensee's programming discretion.
As with indecency and other content-related regulations, the FCC
always struggled to find a balance between preventing "spineless" radio
and ensuring that programming comports with the public interest when
dealing with broadcast hoaxes. Regulation 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217,
prohibiting certain kinds of hoaxes, provides another tool to give the FCC
flexibility in finding that balance. Yet, on a broader level, it often remains
torn on how and when to apply its tools. Much like the rest of the nation,
the FCC might not know how to react to the next Martian invasion until
well after they have landed.
184. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960).
185. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919).
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